Lo spiegamento delle truppe sulle strade delle principali città italiane nell'estate del 2008 ha sollecitato molti commenti dal resto del mondo. In realtà non è una mossa particolarmente insolita. La stessa cosa è successa in India e Cina contemporaneamente. Moreover, the army has been used in several Italian crisis, most recently in early 2008 to remove the rubbish from the streets of Campania. Foreign commentators have asked, in various ways, whether the appearance of armed troops on the streets of Rome and Milan mean the return of fascism, or rather want to know if it's just a sign of the inability of the Italian police forces to fight a ' wave of criminal activity. Finally, ask whether, given the government's concern with the issue of immigrants in Italy, the presence of troops is a sign of xenophobia. This last question is favored by the various pronouncements of the center-right government than the presence of foreigners, which, in spite of the statistics, water, the fear of strangers expressed by some citizens.
consider the role of troops in the streets of Italian cities and try to derive some lessons of general application without reference to particular country. First, there is a wave of criminal activity on the streets of Italy, which remain safe at par with the best urban environments in other parts of Europe. In any case, the emergency services and civil protection are not necessarily completely demilitarized. The police have a police force and a branch of the army, with full military organization. In different parts of Italy they are guardians of public order more visible police force, though no longer visible in the ubiquitous urban police. Second, the State Police and the National Corps of Firemen depend on the Ministry of the Interior, a fact that makes them the central Italian Army. The third consideration is that, as in many other countries, fire brigades are organized on a paramilitary base on the grounds of professionalism, discipline and efficiency at work. In some parts of Italy even hunters are organized on a military features, although the objective is to acquire the raw material of hams, sausages and steaks of wild boar. In other words, there is reason to be especially anxious because of the military organization.
Nevertheless, I have written repeatedly in the past [1] that the measure of the evolution of a civil protection system remains in its degree of demilitarization. In a well-developed service, lack of military organization makes it free from authoritarianism, with a flexible and responsive to the needs for security of the civilian population.
In contrast, civil defense is virtually reborn in 2000, the new age of international terrorism. Paradoxically, after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the decentralization of the response to the crisis has been sharply reversed. In many countries, the central state have launched renewed forms costly, ambitious and often draconian defense civile sotto il titolo di "homeland security" (e in un certo senso è bene che non ci sia una facile traduzione del termine in italiano) o qualsiasi sia il termine di applicazione locale. I "guerrieri freddi" sono tornati in trionfo, contenti di avere un bersaglio, un nemico di nuovo nella personificazione del male, Osama Bin-Laden (il quale, naturalmente, è in gran parte una creazione delle paure e degli interessi dell'Occidente e non è esattamente ben messo per fungere come il nonno del terrorismo moderno come viene caratteristicamente dipinto dai media).
Quando, pochi anni fa, soldati e carri armati sono stati inviati a presiedere sull'Aeroporto di Heathrow a Londra fu detto che l' intelligence militare had identified a specific threat. Maybe, but it was clear that the military forces on the ground would not have prevented the killing of a civilian plane with a missile fired from a house in the districts of West London. Instead, the functions of the troops were tied to their encrypted communications and the visible presence, considered reassuring, armed men in uniform. In any case, it was left to the intelligence services to gather intelligence and police to shadow the infrastructure of terrorism and its lines of command. About
troops on the streets, you have to worry about the cities of the world where they are for years, a permanent presence - or Yangon Harare, perhaps - and what they do when montano le pattuglie. In una società democratica, il personale dell'esercito può fare ben poco per ridurre l'incidenza dell'attività criminale, soprattutto se manca il potere dell'arresto dei sospettati. Tranquilli ambienti urbani non possono essere trattati come se fossero campi di battaglia, oppure ci sarebbero costanti violazioni di diritti civili ed umani. Inoltre, le truppe non sono state formate e addestrate nella prevenzione dei crimini in aree urbane. Le loro uniche doti sono il fattore dell'intimidazione e le armi che sarebbero malavvisati ad usare in qualsiasi circostanza che non fosse una vera e propria emergenza.
Una tregua infelice e non dichiarata esiste tra protezione civile e difesa civile. La prima ha radici locali, è decentrata e esiste con lo scopo di affrontare tanti tipi di contingenza, da caimani nei torrenti a terremoti all'influsso dei pellegrini per il funerale del Santo Padre. Il secondo è controllato dal governo centrale e esiste per proteggere la popolazione civile (oppure i sui rappresentanti ) contro attacco armato. I due sistemi non sono necessariamente distinti, l'uno dall'altro, dai loro nomi, ne ugualmente sviluppati. In Italia, la protezione civile è un fenomeno altamente visibile con basi dovunque nella nazione e migliaia di volontari vestiti in divise colorate. La difesa civile è un servizio molto più riservato, e le suo funzioni vengono discusse molto poco, tranne in prefettura, forse.
La tendenza nella rivalry between defense and civil protection is inherent in the policy of subsidiarity and centrism. The Italian government has put troops on the street is very busy with the subsidiarity, since half of the Council of Ministers talk constantly leave the provincial boundaries by the interference of Rome. However, in this there is an element of deception. Politicians who work at the center in a national government are not particularly inclined to give local government the power to ease, at least so they can not preside over a substantial network decentralization and regionalization of power. So the deployment of troops, solid evidence of the central power.
In operational terms, the deployment of soldiers to stand guard over the strategically important sites is of little importance. It 's very likely not have the necessary education and training in the tactics of counter-urban terrorism, and are not equipped with the appropriate access to intelligence. E 'instead of a visible indication of a more profound and complex linked to the inner workings of government, indeed, the governance. Once, I was part of the mechanism explained by a high-level policy on the table in a restaurant in Lombardy, but I fear it is a bundle of relationships too complex to be understood by as my feeble intellect. In any case, the march of events (SARS, avian flu, earthquakes, chissache?) will change the process and determine, as they do political alliances, what is the possible balance between defense and civil protection. The only certainty is that, with regard to crisis management, the politicians keep a preference for populist decisions, and then are attached to short-termism. At worst, the results are seen in spontaneous reactions to events and ill-considered, as is the deployment of troops on the streets, while at best I am afraid that this is a span of attention to the problem of emergency that remains limited and sporadic.
Note [1] Alexander, D. 2002. From civil defense to civil protection - and back again. Disaster Prevention and Management 11 (3): 209-213.
