Wednesday, October 29, 2008

Twilight Digital Copy

Italia happy-go-lucky, ovvero la futura strage degli innocenti



I learn from the news today, October 20, 2008, the Italian Government, through the law 'Gelmini' (DL137 conversion of 09/01/2008) recently approved, has allocated the sum of € 20 million for structural measures on schools in the Bel Paese. Great!

In Italy there are 57,000 schools, 42,000 public school system. 70% of the population lives in seismically active zones, and 40% in areas at high risk from earthquakes. A third of schools are at risk of earthquakes and at least one third of these are at high risk. A total of 22,800 schools are not in accordance with seismic. Of 6,000 schools that are most in need of structural earthquake-resistant, were selected from 2,000 high priority - but where are the funds?

In Italy, the last earthquake with an epicenter in the immediate vicinity of a large urban center was to Avezzano back in 1915. Died 90% of the population of 11,000 inhabitants. It 'good to remember that the average interval between an earthquake damaging (or lethal) and the next is less than 60 months. And not only occur in open country.

Worldwide, there are different earthquakes nei tempi recenti che hanno distrutto le scuole en masse . Ad esempio, 103 scuole sono crollate interamente e 2813 sono state gravemente danneggiate nel terremoto di Boumerdes in Algeria, 2003. Nel terremoto di Kashmir, nel 2005, 10.000 scuole sono crollate, ammazzando 17.000 bambini (dati incredibili, ma confermati dall'ONU e dall'OMS). Nell'evento sismico in Sichuan, Cina, maggio 2008, centinai di scuole sono diventate macerie, e in un sol complesso scolastico ben 500 ragazzi sono morti.

Alcuni anni fa sono andato a visitare una scuola, elementare e media insieme, in una zona montuosa dell'Italia centrale. L'edificio, in cemento armato anni 1950, era tremendamente fatiscente. La zona è in attesa di uno sostanzioso deadly earthquake. In 50 years had never practiced an evacuation of the school, and, judging from the cracked and rusty, even an intervention of structural adjustment. A local policeman told me, with evident satisfaction, that the structure was perfectly earthquake, based on what evidence I do not know.

Twenty million euro are probably sufficient to bring between 10 and 20 schools out of 6,000. The consequences of inaction could be like in San Giuliano di Puglia in 2002, but a much larger scale.

I feel a deep sense of fatigue, as a parent who has struggled against the bad education of her son throughout the day. Sooner or later it will be another major seismic event. If it happens when schools are not in use, will be a problem to find classrooms in post-emergency phase. If, however, happens when students are in school ... Potentially, expect a massacre of the innocents, followed by a period of agonizing moans, cries tearing, anger, accusations, cancellations, those defense, who resigned (after a decent interval, to reappear as if nothing had happened), etc.. Etc. . etc. So I'm tired.

Moreover, it is better that there be a national debate on these things. In certain areas of the peninsula, the level of fear and stress should be the stars. Better, perhaps, to put faith in a figure in robe, sitting on a cloud, extending the arms Heaven protects and who goes to school with his piety. [1] Or we can take refuge in the world smiles and songs of television.

If the National Government does not allocate funds (and I do not think that regions are able to do so), maybe you could have recourse to the four mafias? If it is true, as they say the media, which have a much greater turnover of large multinational domestic industry, would be easily able to do something. And when the mafia lords are not killing people, are known for their piety.

To have recourse to irony in this way means that I have been overwhelmed by anger and frustration. But it seems to me, in front of this carelessness, the school has taught (For young people, parents and older) only amnesia.

Postscript, NOVEMBER 25. 2008: The collapse of a ceiling to a school in Rivoli, near Turin, has killed a 17 year old boy and seriously injured some of his classmates. Apparently 7.5% of the funds needed for the adjustment of public schools (maybe not only concerns the seismic) are available, though the figure would be 12.5% \u200b\u200bif it were not for the bureaucracy associated with the delivery of funds . As in the case of San Giuliano di Puglia, only the death of the boys stimulates the arrival of the funds (with low winds), and attention to the problem. Meanwhile, reports from all parts of Italy published its The Republic Corriere della Sera and indicate a widespread lack of emergency planning, structural adjustment and interest by the authorities. This is a massive violation of the right of the child (or girl) to an education in safety, as outlined by the Coalition for Global School Safety, COGSS.

[1] A problem of the immediate result of Italian earthquakes, especially in the South, is that people unharmed runs to church to pray, while the churches are among the buildings under earthquake resistance. In a seismic event in eastern Sicily in the '90s, the villagers ran to the statue of the Madonna in the church. The building has barely survived the aftershocks, la la statua e l'altare sono crollati sui fedeli raggruppati sotto.

Articoli da leggere:-

Augenti, N, E. Cosenza, M. Dolce, G. Manfredi, A. Masi and L. Samela 2004. Performance of school buildings during the 2002 Molise, Italy, earthquake. Earthquake Spectra 20(S1): S257-S270.

Grant, D.N., J.J. Bommer, R. Pinho, G.M. Calvi, A. Goretti and F. Meroni 2007. A prioritization scheme for seismic intervention in school buildings in Italy. Earthquake Spectra 23(2): 291-314.

Sito da visitare:-

Coalition for Global School Safety, www.interragate.info/cogss

Tuesday, September 23, 2008

I Like Touching My Moms Boobs

Il ruolo della formazione nella gestione delle emergenze


Fig 1. Forms of planning for relief operations.



Figure 2. A training course in civil defense.

The management of rescue operations following disasters, crises and emergencies is a relatively new field, but, nevertheless, may draw on a tradition of study and research which dates originally from the year 1920 (Prince 1920, Barrows 1923) and that is strong and supported from 1950 onwards. While the field is sometimes included in the science programs of management, in reality it is a discipline in itself, fondata su diverse basi. I suoi obiettivi fondamentali sono quattro (Waugh e Tierney 2007):

- in situazioni di crisi, abbinare le risorse a disposizione con il fabbisogno urgente;

- permettere diversi enti ed organizzazioni di lavorare insieme in modo efficace sotto condizioni difficili e probabilmente insolite;

- comunicare con unità operative e centri operativi in modo tale da mantenere il livello di comando e controllo delle situazioni di crisi;

- applicare i provvedimenti del piano di emergenza, insieme a rilevanti protocolli operativi e patti di assistenza mutua, secondo le esigenze del disastro.

Questi processi richiedono una conoscenza di come lavorano le diverse organizzazioni and various specialists in the rescue. Therefore, the management of emergencies (emergency management ) is a cross-discipline (Phillips 2005), which must develop a language and a culture shared by at least 35 professions and disciplines involved in one way or another, in the 'disaster cycle' (mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery and reconstruction). The complex process of coordinating emergency work requires the ability to understand and work with representatives of various disciplines, in fact, to "speak their language in order to understand their views and help them cope with the emergency effectively (Alexander 2002).

La gestione delle emergenze è una disciplina olistica, concreta e dedicata alla soluzione di problemi pratici (McEntire 2003). Essa è fortemente legata alla pianificazione d'emergenza, alla gestione della continuità degli affari aziendali (business continuity management, BCM; Elliott et alii 2001), alla risposta medica all'emergenza ed ad altri campi di natura altamente pratica. Gli imperativi sono di salvare le vite umane, aiutare a coordinare il soccorso delle vittime, contenere e ridurre i danni, e assicurare un rapido ritorno ad accettabili condizioni normali.

Nel mondo moderno, ci sono numerose associazioni alle quali i coordinatori di emergenza possono aderire. L'Istituto di Protezione Civile e Gestione delle Emergenze (ICPEM, already Institute of Civil Defense and Disaster Studio) was founded in the United Kingdom in 1937 and is a company filled with academic titles, the oldest in the world. The UK Emergency Planning Society (EPS) has 3000 members, while the International Society of Emergency Coordinators (IAEM) has 4500. The latter offers a professional qualification of global validity, the examination for Certified Emergency Manager (CEM). Throughout the world, IAEM vigorously promotes eight principles of emergency management (see Table 1). From these it is clear that emergency management requires skills such as leadership, the ability to coordinate, plus a strong knowledge of emergency (Haddow and Bullock 2003).

Worldwide, there are at least 400 books on the market (in English) relevant to emergency management. Since 1950 in this field and related subjects at least 19,000 books and scholarly articles have been published, also in English and worldwide. When teaching emergency management, it is important to use the fruits of research (Coppola 2008) and combine theory with experience derived from managing the events of the past (Alexander 2000). Both of these aspects are essential. The theory provides a kind of "road map" of the chaotic emergency situations (Drabek 2006). Using the theoretical concepts as a guide, the people trained in this field should understand highly complex processes. Included in the list command and control, evacuation, vulnerability analysis (social, economic and physical), communication (again with physical and social components), notice, search and rescue, and medical and health response to emergencies.

An emergency coordinator must be able to create, disseminate, maintain, enforce and update contingency plans for three types (Fig. 1). First there is the permanent plan that has the resources in a crisis. This requires the formulation (with great precision) of scenarios depicting the impact and dynamic response, the study of the available resources and procedures to be applied. Secondly, there contingency planning will be the pre-impact and then, thirdly, the short-term strategic planning to make during the emergency phase. The plans of all types must be compatible with different levels of government, different areas and jurisdictions, and emergency services. There is also an international dimension that includes the European Union and the Organization of the United Nations, for example in respect of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN-ISDR) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The work of coordination of emergency response can be local, inter-regional (in the case of national emergency) or European (in the case of an event affects more than one country or that it be so great as to require the input of resources from abroad). It may be of interest to developing countries, as in the case of humanitarian missions. In any case, for planning and managing these contingencies standardized methods exist and should be taught (ISDR 2005).

In terms of threats and scenarios, the modern emergency coordinator must understand and respond to a wide range of risks and events. Natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes are a category. Technological risks such as collisions and transport toxic rain is another. A third is made up of social risks such as rallies and mass protests, and the fourth category is the risk of intentional acts, terrorism, which also includes the collection of intelligence and military intervention and civil defense. In addition there are emerging risks (Schieb 2006). Of these pandemics are generally considered the most pressing, followed by the effects of climate change and the disruption of basic services, or impairment of the food chain. Based on these risks, the landscape of civil protection could change radically in just a few months, so flexibility is a vital quality to teach the coordinator of emergency operations (see table 1).

the coordination of emergency is a revolution taking place di tecnologia di comunicazione ed informazione. Questa ha avuto effetti profondi sulla risposta a disastri e crisi (Marincioni 2007). Quindi, è importante insegnare sia gli aspetti tecnici che il lato umano della comunicazione, compresa l'apposita ricerca in sociologia, psicologia e percezione. Dato che circa l'80% della pianificazione di emergenza costituisca un problema geografico e territoriale, i sistemi di informazione georeferenziata (GIS) sono un arnese essenziale (Dubois et alii 2006). Questi servizi ed attività saranno probabilmente concentrati nel centro operativo e il coordinatore di emergenza deve acquisire una piena conoscenza del suo potenziale e delle sue funzioni.

Recentemente è successa un'enorme crescita nella gestione continuity of business enterprise (BCM - see above). This new framework has been applied to both the public and the private economy. Its main objective is to make companies and governments resistant to disasters and crises, and enable it to overcome the hardships without going bankrupt, which is a very strong risk for companies not prepared. For the public sector in times of disaster is to prevent substantial disruptions to their services. In promoting preparations, the emergency coordinator plays a key role (Halliwell 2008).

In summary, the emergency coordinator must help to create resilience. This term comes from the rheology, the science materials, and is rapidly becoming a distinct philosophy of the organization against threats, risks, crises and disasters (Batabyal 1998). In creating resilience, the challenge is to ensure the professionalization of emergency coordinators through the rigorous application of training and the creation of recognized and respected. It 'also important to ensure that the work of emergency management in the hands of well trained professionals, in other words there is an institutional role for graduates in this field. Great progress is made in some countries, notably the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden and India (Berkes 2007). It 'important that Italy will not be left back.

If education is the engine of the professionalization of the role of coordinator of emergency, which is the best way to organize it? Despite the attractions of the basic degree course in civil defense, a clear consensus that the best solution is that of higher degree. A basic degree in another field (sociology, architecture, engineering, geology, psychology or any discipline pertaining to the work of disaster reduction) can serve as a preparation on which to lay deep and solid work experience and training in civil protection transverse (ie, interdisciplinary), offered as a degree of specialization (Fig. 2). In the latter, the student, studies already mature, learning to coordinate, manage, and interviews with various specialists in order to create the 'common culture' in the civil protection has strong need (Neal 2000). The product of a process like this should be someone with flexibility and adaptability, two qualities are essential in emergency situations and risk.

Citations

Alexander, DE 2000. Scenario methodology for teaching Principles of Emergency Management. Disaster Prevention and Management 9 (2): 89-97.

Alexander, DE 2002. Principles of Emergency Planning and Management . Terra Publishing, Harpenden, UK; Oxford University Press, New York, 340 pp.

Barrows, H.H. 1923. Geography as human ecology. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 13: 1-14.

Batabyal, A.A. 1998. The concept of resilience: retrospect and prospect. Environment and Development Economics 3(2): 235-239.

Berkes, F. 2007. Understanding uncertainty and reducing vulnerability: lessons from resilience thinking. Natural Hazards 41(2): 283-295.

Coppola , D.P. 2008. The importance of international disaster management studies in the field of emergency management. In Emergency Management in Higher Education: Current Practices and Conversations . Public Entity Research Institute, Fairfax, Virginia (Capitolo 5).

Drabek, T.E. 2006. Social Dimensions of Disaster: a teaching resource for university faculty. Journal of Emergency Management 4(5): 39-46.

Dubois, G., E.J. Pebesma e P. Bossew 2006. Automatic mapping in emergency: a geostatistical perspective. International Journal of Emergency Management 4(3): 455-467.

Elliott, D., E. Swartz e B. Herbane (curatori) 2001. Business Continuity Management: A Crisis Management Approach . Routledge, Londra, 206 pp.

Haddow, G.D. e J.A. Bullock. 2003. Introduction to Emergency Management . Butterworth-Heinemann, Londra, 272 pp.

Halliwell, P. 2008. How to distinguish between 'business as usual' and 'significant business disruptions' and plan accordingly. Journal of Business Continuity and Emergency Planning 2(2): 118-127.

ISDR Secretariat 2005. Know Risk . Tudor Rose, Londra, 376 pp.

Marincioni, F. 2007. Information technologies and the sharing of disaster knowledge: the critical role of professional culture. Disasters 31(4): 459-476.

McEntire, D.A. 2003. Searching for a holistic paradigm and policy guide: a proposal for the future of emergency management. International Journal of Emergency Management 1(3): 298-308.

Neal, D.M. 2000. Developing degree programs in disaster management: some reflections and observations. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 18(3): 417-438.

Phillips, B.D. 2005. Disaster as a discipline. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 23(1): 111-140.

Prince, S. 1920. Catastrophe and Social Change: Based Upon a Sociological Study of the Halifax Disaster . Studies in History, Economics and Public Law no. 94. Colombia University Press, New York, 151 pp.

Schieb, P-A. 2006. Emerging risks and risk management policies in selected OECD countries. In W.J. Ammann, S. Dannenmann e L. Vulliet (curatori) Risk 21: Coping with Risks Due to Natural Hazards in the 21st Century . A.A. Balkema, Taylor & Francis, Londra: 31-40.

Waugh, W.L. Jr e K. Tierney 2007. Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local Government (2a edizione). ICMA Press, International City Management Association, Washington, D.C., 366 pp.

_______________________________________________

Tabella n. 1. I principi IAEM della gestione dell'emergenza

1. Comprensiva : per quanto riguarda i disastri, i coordinatori di emergenza dovrebbero prendere in considerazione tutti i rischi, tutte le fasi, tutti gli impatti e tutti gli interessati.

2. Progressive: emergency coordinators should anticipate future disasters and take preventive and preparatory measures to create disaster-resistant and resilient communities.

3. Risk Management: to coordinate the priorities and resources, emergency coordinators should use the principles of good risk management, based on the identification of hazards and an analysis of risks and impacts.

4. Integrated: emergency coordinators should ensure a degree of unity among all levels of government and all elements of the community.

5. Collaborative : coordinators emergenza dovrebbero creare e mantenere rapporti larghi e sinceri tra persone ed organizzazioni atti ad incoraggiare fiducia, promuovere un'atmosfera da squadra, creare consenso e facilitare comunicazione.

6. Coordinata : per arrivare ad obiettivi comuni, i coordinatori di emergenza dovrebbero sincronizzare le attività di tutti gli interessati.

7. Flessibile : quando si tratta di affrontare la sfida dei disastri, i coordinatori di emergenza dovrebbero utilizzare approcci creativi e innovativi.

8. Professionale : i coordinatori di emergenza dovrebbero utilizzare un approccio basato su principi scientifici, radicati nella conoscenza accademica della materia, con ampio riferimento alla formazione, l'addestramento, l'etica, il servizio pubblico e il costante miglioramento.

NB: Questo principi costituiscono la base della definizione del profilo professionale del coordinatore di emergenza, come utilizzato nell'esame del CEM – Certified Emergency Manager .
_________________________________________________

Friday, August 8, 2008

Rapid Heart Beat, Left Arm Numbness

L'esercito sulle strade delle città italiane



Lo spiegamento delle truppe sulle strade delle principali città italiane nell'estate del 2008 ha sollecitato molti commenti dal resto del mondo. In realtà non è una mossa particolarmente insolita. La stessa cosa è successa in India e Cina contemporaneamente. Moreover, the army has been used in several Italian crisis, most recently in early 2008 to remove the rubbish from the streets of Campania. Foreign commentators have asked, in various ways, whether the appearance of armed troops on the streets of Rome and Milan mean the return of fascism, or rather want to know if it's just a sign of the inability of the Italian police forces to fight a ' wave of criminal activity. Finally, ask whether, given the government's concern with the issue of immigrants in Italy, the presence of troops is a sign of xenophobia. This last question is favored by the various pronouncements of the center-right government than the presence of foreigners, which, in spite of the statistics, water, the fear of strangers expressed by some citizens.

consider the role of troops in the streets of Italian cities and try to derive some lessons of general application without reference to particular country. First, there is a wave of criminal activity on the streets of Italy, which remain safe at par with the best urban environments in other parts of Europe. In any case, the emergency services and civil protection are not necessarily completely demilitarized. The police have a police force and a branch of the army, with full military organization. In different parts of Italy they are guardians of public order more visible police force, though no longer visible in the ubiquitous urban police. Second, the State Police and the National Corps of Firemen depend on the Ministry of the Interior, a fact that makes them the central Italian Army. The third consideration is that, as in many other countries, fire brigades are organized on a paramilitary base on the grounds of professionalism, discipline and efficiency at work. In some parts of Italy even hunters are organized on a military features, although the objective is to acquire the raw material of hams, sausages and steaks of wild boar. In other words, there is reason to be especially anxious because of the military organization.

Nevertheless, I have written repeatedly in the past [1] that the measure of the evolution of a civil protection system remains in its degree of demilitarization. In a well-developed service, lack of military organization makes it free from authoritarianism, with a flexible and responsive to the needs for security of the civilian population.

In contrast, civil defense is virtually reborn in 2000, the new age of international terrorism. Paradoxically, after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the decentralization of the response to the crisis has been sharply reversed. In many countries, the central state have launched renewed forms costly, ambitious and often draconian defense civile sotto il titolo di "homeland security" (e in un certo senso è bene che non ci sia una facile traduzione del termine in italiano) o qualsiasi sia il termine di applicazione locale. I "guerrieri freddi" sono tornati in trionfo, contenti di avere un bersaglio, un nemico di nuovo nella personificazione del male, Osama Bin-Laden (il quale, naturalmente, è in gran parte una creazione delle paure e degli interessi dell'Occidente e non è esattamente ben messo per fungere come il nonno del terrorismo moderno come viene caratteristicamente dipinto dai media).

Quando, pochi anni fa, soldati e carri armati sono stati inviati a presiedere sull'Aeroporto di Heathrow a Londra fu detto che l' intelligence militare had identified a specific threat. Maybe, but it was clear that the military forces on the ground would not have prevented the killing of a civilian plane with a missile fired from a house in the districts of West London. Instead, the functions of the troops were tied to their encrypted communications and the visible presence, considered reassuring, armed men in uniform. In any case, it was left to the intelligence services to gather intelligence and police to shadow the infrastructure of terrorism and its lines of command. About

troops on the streets, you have to worry about the cities of the world where they are for years, a permanent presence - or Yangon Harare, perhaps - and what they do when montano le pattuglie. In una società democratica, il personale dell'esercito può fare ben poco per ridurre l'incidenza dell'attività criminale, soprattutto se manca il potere dell'arresto dei sospettati. Tranquilli ambienti urbani non possono essere trattati come se fossero campi di battaglia, oppure ci sarebbero costanti violazioni di diritti civili ed umani. Inoltre, le truppe non sono state formate e addestrate nella prevenzione dei crimini in aree urbane. Le loro uniche doti sono il fattore dell'intimidazione e le armi che sarebbero malavvisati ad usare in qualsiasi circostanza che non fosse una vera e propria emergenza.

Una tregua infelice e non dichiarata esiste tra protezione civile e difesa civile. La prima ha radici locali, è decentrata e esiste con lo scopo di affrontare tanti tipi di contingenza, da caimani nei torrenti a terremoti all'influsso dei pellegrini per il funerale del Santo Padre. Il secondo è controllato dal governo centrale e esiste per proteggere la popolazione civile (oppure i sui rappresentanti ) contro attacco armato. I due sistemi non sono necessariamente distinti, l'uno dall'altro, dai loro nomi, ne ugualmente sviluppati. In Italia, la protezione civile è un fenomeno altamente visibile con basi dovunque nella nazione e migliaia di volontari vestiti in divise colorate. La difesa civile è un servizio molto più riservato, e le suo funzioni vengono discusse molto poco, tranne in prefettura, forse.

La tendenza nella rivalry between defense and civil protection is inherent in the policy of subsidiarity and centrism. The Italian government has put troops on the street is very busy with the subsidiarity, since half of the Council of Ministers talk constantly leave the provincial boundaries by the interference of Rome. However, in this there is an element of deception. Politicians who work at the center in a national government are not particularly inclined to give local government the power to ease, at least so they can not preside over a substantial network decentralization and regionalization of power. So the deployment of troops, solid evidence of the central power.

In operational terms, the deployment of soldiers to stand guard over the strategically important sites is of little importance. It 's very likely not have the necessary education and training in the tactics of counter-urban terrorism, and are not equipped with the appropriate access to intelligence. E 'instead of a visible indication of a more profound and complex linked to the inner workings of government, indeed, the governance. Once, I was part of the mechanism explained by a high-level policy on the table in a restaurant in Lombardy, but I fear it is a bundle of relationships too complex to be understood by as my feeble intellect. In any case, the march of events (SARS, avian flu, earthquakes, chissache?) will change the process and determine, as they do political alliances, what is the possible balance between defense and civil protection. The only certainty is that, with regard to crisis management, the politicians keep a preference for populist decisions, and then are attached to short-termism. At worst, the results are seen in spontaneous reactions to events and ill-considered, as is the deployment of troops on the streets, while at best I am afraid that this is a span of attention to the problem of emergency that remains limited and sporadic.



Note [1] Alexander, D. 2002. From civil defense to civil protection - and back again. Disaster Prevention and Management 11 (3): 209-213.

Thursday, July 17, 2008

Changing Thermostat Subaru Impreza

Le persone disabili nelle grandi emergenze



Introduction

In a civilized world people with disabilities should enjoy the opportunity to participate in the community with a number of barriers as low as possible. There is no justification to abandon this principle in major emergencies. However, people with disabilities may experience physical barriers or be subject to particular difficulties in communicating that prevent them from responding effectively to crisis situations and deny them the opportunity to obtain technical assistance provided to persons without disabilities.

The whole question of how to provide assistance to disabled persons in emergency situations has been largely ignored. The body of academic literature on the subject remains very small (eg. Parr 1987, Tierney et al 1988) and there are no particular signs of renewal of the commitment of scholars. In addition, the issue is rarely discussed during the meetings of civil protection. Despite this, there have been some useful initiatives, such as the Verona Charter on the Rights of People with Disabilities in Disaster (ULSS20 Verona, 2007 - see below). In the world there are some study centers (eg. The Centre for Disability Studies, University of Leeds, UK; Hemingway and Priestley 2006, Priestley and Hemingway 2006) and have been published copies of some manual procedures (eg. FEMA 2003). However, some reports on the state of the art in this field have provided a list of measures and inadequate descriptions of cases of failure care (CID 2004, Tady, 2006, White et al 2004).

This article will attempt to restore balance and encourage measures to promote good care of the disabled in disaster. Address some of the main issues related to the condition of disabled persons in crisis situations generally will try to detect problems and draw attention to some possible solutions.

In the context of civil protection, what is disability? The classic

view of disability is that of a person in a wheelchair to be taken away by force from the source of physical danger. In reality the issue is much more complex. First, there are many forms of disability, the list includes paraplegia, quadriplegia, deafness, blindness and visual defects, illness and mental retardation, brain damage, stroke, senility and dementia, Alzheimer's disease and, in fact, many forms of dependence on personnel, equipment and supplies to support vital functions. Although old age is not in itself a disability, many elderly people are weak, lack of agility of younger people and can also be sick or suffering from various medical conditions.

Compared to the classification, the disabled fall into the following categories: problems of mobility, inability to see (with the possible use of guide dogs), deafness, problems of communication and articulation of words (as in victims of stroke), cognitive disorders, various medical problems, need to use life support systems, intolerance to chemicals or environmental, psychiatric disorders and panic attacks, and weakness due to old age. So the list is long and impressive. In addition, people with disabilities may suffer from more than one form of disability. Clearly, the different categories should be associated with an extensive list of measures to be taken during emergencies, including transport of disabled persons, the use of specialized means of communication for people with cognitive difficulties or defects in articulation of words, use of portable tools replacement or other means to those in need of life support systems, and psychiatric support for people with mental health problems.

disasters may create discrimination against persons with disabilities. For example, in the event of an earthquake on a person confined to a wheelchair could not take refuge under a desk or table, or run into the street via the stairs of a building (Rahimi 1993, 1994). Le persone sorde, o affette da difetti visivi, potrebbero non riconoscere un pericolo o non sentire istruzioni verbali che intimino l'evacuazione (Kailes 2002). Per di più, le persone che dipendono da attrezzature elettriche (macchine per la dialisi, ventilatori, o semplicemente mezzi elettronici di comunicazione) potrebbero trovarsi in difficoltà nel caso in cui la corrente elettrica venisse a mancare durante un'emergenza. Infine, tutti i servizi offerti al pubblico generale nelle emergenze e nelle crisi (trasporto per l'evacuazione, alloggio provvisorio, assistenza morale e psicologica, ecc.) dovrebbero essere accessibili anche ai disabili.

Il problema, si nota, non è insignificante. In Toscana, il 16% of the population report some form of disability. Ben 54 million Americans and 90 million Indians are disabled (and in India the basic law on civil protection offers no provision for the disabled). At the time of Hurricane Katrina on the U.S. coast of the Gulf of Mexico, well 155,000 people in three cities of Biloxi (MS), Mobile (AL) and New Orleans (LA) were registered as disabled. Many found themselves in serious difficulties on arrival of the hurricane. Since 71% of the 1,330 confirmed victims of the hurricane were people older than 60 years, it is clear that the impact of the disaster was huge on the disabled (Tady 2006). Despite the fact

that 19.3% of the U.S. population suffers from some form of disability, as much as 80% of emergency coordinators consulted in a recent survey (NCD 2005) did not take into account people with disabilities in their emergency plans. In fact, 57% did not know how many disabled people were registered in their jurisdiction, and only 27% of them had taken a course offered by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on how to protect disabled people in disasters. Moreover, the problem can be particularly serious if the event is of vast proportions: for example, on 11 September 2001 a group of physically disabled people gathered in a room eightieth floor of the World Trade Center in New York waiting to be evacuated by firemen, but the building collapsed before they could be saved (CID 2004).

We can conclude that major emergencies bring people with disabilities more at risk than other members of the population, can trap them and put them in jeopardy by the imposition of new barriers. Despite this negative picture, not everyone sees the situation in a negative way. For example, in 1994 in the Mainstream magazine, Douglas Lathrop wrote that "in a way that disabled people can live with some level of independence are more prepared to deal with dangerous situations than people without disabilities. They benefit from a 'psychological advantage'..." (Lathtrop 2004). E 'possible, but when it occurs undisastro we can not and must not leave everything to the special survival skills of the disabled. The next section is then devoted to practical strategies for assistance.

Helping people with disabilities in disasters

In an emergency situation it's pretty easy not to recognize the nature of the disability that a person accused and so it is possible that the assistance provided is the wrong type. Organizations working in civil protection are used to provide assistance to large groups of people, but disabled people have individual needs that may differ from those of the groups. In fact, to assist the disabled in disaster means not only introduce specific procedures, but also establish special preparations and plans are hand made for their needs. Unfortunately, pay attention to individuals in emergencies requires precisely when labor supply is considerably short of demand. However, special assistance is one way of showing that, despite their disabilities, people with disabilities are full members of society, with all the benefits, rights and privileges associated with this.

In planning and emergency management would be the time to consider the problems, special needs and views of disabled people. For example, follow the evacuation plan calls for the più l'abilità di camminare, guidare, vedere e udire. Bisogna dunque adattare tali piani ai bisogni delle persone che non possono fare una o più di queste cose (Kailes 2002).

L'esperienza dei disabili nei disastri rileva certi bisogni, come ad esempio assicurare la continuità dei servizi per persone che dipendono dalla presenza dell'elettricità, del telefono, dell'acqua corrente, e di altri servizi di base. Le persone disabili hanno bisogno di sapere come cavarsela quando ci sono disordini e detriti a casa, e quali servizi di trasporto e mobilità saranno disponibili nelle situazioni di crisi. Devono inoltre essere informate su come possono rifornirsi di generi di prima necessità nelle situazioni di emergenza. Esiste the question of how soddisfarei needs of dogs (FEMA 2003).

A report on disabled people in disasters (White et al 2004) argues that very few empirical data have been collected on the question of how to evacuate disabled people effectively and safely during emergencies and disasters (see Kailes 2002). Moreover, in many situations lack the integration and cooperation between different organizations working with disabled people and representatives of civil protection that plan and manage emergency response. It 'important to start the dialogue, because the issue is complex. No single strategy applies to all disabilities. Also, how to assist people with disabilities to better a matter linked to other needs, such as assistance to minority ethnic groups, single mothers, and people who need special medications.

's relatively easy to list the basic principles that govern the disabled. First, the services and procedures should be available equally in times of calm and crisis. Emergency communications should be accessible, understandable and reliable. The associations regularly provide assistance to people with disabilities should be involved in civil protection activities and in the planning process. Where there is a real risk of disaster, should prepare a special program of preparation, education and training for both members of civil protection for the disabled beneficiaries of their services. Finally, we draw the media attention on their potential role as providers of emergency information to the disabled.

A guide to civil protection written specifically for people with disabilities (FEMA / ARC 2004) recommends three actions to be performed, if possible. The first is to estimate the type and extent of risks at work and at home. Second, they should create a support network composed of at least three people for each place you usually frequent. The third action is to assess their ability to respond with self-protective actions in case of crisis. In addition to the types of disability that are not obvious, it might be helpful to wear a necklace or a bracelet indicating the disability in question. These are examples of a practical approach that can be done to increase the safety of disabled people in crisis situations. However, this form of pragmatism depends on the ability and willingness to develop a positive attitude towards the problem in the community of representatives of civil protection.

Conclusions

As noted above, the academic literature on disabilities in disasters is really poor (Parr 1987, Rahimi 1993, Tierney et al 1988). It seems that this indicates that the problem is still neglected in both theoretical and practical terms. It is however, clearly a matter of great importance. In the words of Hemingway and Priestley (2006): -

"The disabled have been made more vulnerable to natural hazards through historical processes of exclusion and impoverishment. As a result, their experience of disaster may be more acute and more long life compared to non-disabled population. Throughout the world these effects are accentuated in poor communities, where people with disabilities remain among the poorest of the poor. Also, when a disaster strikes, people with disabilities are experiencing differences in access to housing temporary and rescue and are often excluded from full participation in the activities of response and recovery. "

The idea that the occurrence of an emergency or disaster means the suspension of normal rules should not result in discrimination against the disabled in terms of the assistance. It should instead mean the opposite, doubling efforts to assist the disabled in emergencies, and giving special consideration and priority to their needs. In addition, the occurrence of crisis conditions should not offer an excuse for violating the dignity of disabled people. It 'important to consider the category of people with disabilities in the formulation of emergency plans. This is a moral imperative and also a matter of simple justice and equality. E 'need to know where are the disabled when there are emergencies and ensure that the right services are available to them. It may also be recommended monitoring element to ensure that disabled people are not subject to discrimination. In the European Union

the publication of the Verona Charter on the Rescue of Persons with Disabilities in Case of Disaster (ULSS20 Verona 2007) is a milestone in the official recognition of a problem that must be addressed. The Verona Charter is the culmination of a project that has studied the category of disabled people in disasters in various countries of Europe and has therefore contributed to the formulation of a clear picture of the problem and possible solutions. Despite a record full of bad examples (see NCD, 2005), there is always the opportunity to improve the situation. Doing so would be a sign of civilization and an affirmation of the rights of people who, despite their disabilities, are full members of society and deserve to be protected when a disaster strikes.
Citations

CID 2004. Lessons Learned from the World Trade Center Disaster: Emergency Preparedness for People with Disabilities in New York . Center for Independence of the Disabled, New York (see http://www.cidny.org/ ).

FEMA 2003. for People with Disabilities Disaster Preparedness . U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington DC (vedi www.fema.gov/library/disprepf.shtm).FEMA/ARC 2004. Preparing for Disaster for People with Disabilities and Other Special Needs. US Federal Emergency Management Agency and American Red Cross Society, Washington DC, 20 pp.
Hemingway, L. e M. Priestley 2006. Natural hazards, human vulnerability and disabling societies: a disaster for disabled people? Review of Disability Studies 2(3): 57-67.

Kailes, J. 2002. Evacuation Preparedness: Taking Responsibility For Your Safety: A Guide For People With Disabilities and Other Activity Limitations . Center for Disability Issues and the Health Profession, Western University of Health Sciences, Pomona, California (vedi www.westernu.edu/cdihp.html ).

Lathrop, D. 1994. Disaster! If you have a disability, the forces of nature can be meaner to you than anyone else. But you can fight back. Be prepared. Mainstream (Nov. 1994), (vedi www.accessiblesociety.org/topics/independentliving/disaster.htm ).

NCD 2005. Saving Lives: Including People with Disabilities in Emergency Planning . US National Council on Disability, Washington DC (vedi http://www.ncd.gov/ ).

Parr, A.R. 1987. Disasters and disabled persons: an examination of the safety needs of a neglected minority. Disasters 11(2): 148-159.

Priestley, M. e L. Hemingway 2006. Disabled people and disaster recovery: a tale of two cities? Journal of Social Work in Disability and Rehabilitation 5(3/4): 23-42.

Rahimi, M. 1993. An examination of behaviour and hazards faced by physically disabled people during the Loma Prieta earthquake. Natural Hazards 7(1): 59-82.

Rahimi, M. 1994. Behavior of mobility-disabled people in earthquakes: a simulation experiment. Earthquake Spectra 10(2): 381-401.

Tady, M. 2006. Disabled people left behind in emergencies. The New Standard .

Tierney, K., W. Petak and H. Hahn 1988. Disabled Persons and Earthquake Hazards . Monografia n. 46, Institute of Behavioral Science, Program on Environment and Behavior, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.

ULSS20 Verona 2007. Verona Charter on the Rescue of Persons with Disabilities in Case of Disasters . ULSS no. 20, Verona, 17 pp.

White, G., M. Fox, J. Rowland, C. Rooney and S. Aldana 2004. Nobody Left Behind: Investigating Disaster Preparedness and Response for People with Disabilities . Lawrence, Kansas ( see www.rtcil.org / resources.htm ).

Thursday, June 5, 2008

Cigar Lighter Receptacle How To Replace

Gestione dei disastri: anatomia e tendenze




Terminology and definitions

As regards terminology, emergency management (disaster management ) is a minefield. Academics and practitioners have completed at least 7 schools of thought. [1] Since each of these schools have maintained a certain detachment from others, communication between disciplines was inhibited by the use of a diverse range of definitions of key terms such as 'danger' ( hazard ) , 'vulnerability' and 'risk'. In addition, persino il nome del campo è soggetto a variazioni da un ambiente accademico all'altro. Nella Gran Bretagna, per esempio, 'disaster management' riferisce a diversi aspetti della protezione civile, la gestione dei rischi e le operazioni di scopo umanitario, e il nome non significa soltanto la gestione di eventi estremi e dannosi.

Un effetto dello scopo straordinariamente largo della disaster management è che gli esperti non riescano a mettersi d'accordo sulla definizione dei termini. Malgrado alcuni tentativi di unire le due fazioni, rimane un grande schisma tra le scienze naturali, fisiche e di costruzione, da una parte, e le scienze sociali dall'altra. In un commento su questo fenomeno il grande sociologo E.L. Quarantelli ha notato nell'introduzione of his book What is a Disaster? that:

"If scholars in this area do not agree on whether a disaster is fundamentally a social construction or a physical event, the field has clear intellectual problems" (Quarantelli 1998, p. iv).

However, in a previous work he argued that the debate is healthy:

"taking care of what does the term 'disaster' means not getting distracted by an academic exercise with no results. It is instead a way to focus in a fundamental way on what should be considered important and significant ... " (Quarantelli1995, p. 225) [2]

The purpose of this report is not to investigate the meaning of a disaster or to add material to the debate on terminology. However, since the identity of any future initiative depends to a certain point the name used, it is worthwhile to conduct a quick review of terms and how they are interpreted.

Disaster management is preferred in Britain but the world is not accepted as an umbrella term. In its favor, is a descriptive term easily interpreted with emphasis on practical approach that is committed when the events should be managed. On the other hand, is too narrow, since it does not embrace the planning of interventions related disasters, a process that must necessarily precede management. Furthermore, the term does not embrace emergencies in the broadest sense, and some emergencies require special handling but do not become disasters. Finally, the term does not describe the broader approach of mitigation and preparedness and recovery after events.

Emergency preparedness (emergency preparedness) is the term commonly used in the U.S. and is used when a disaster management would be preferred in Britain. This term has the advantage of embracing all five phases of the 'disaster cycle' (mitigation, preparedness, emergency operations, rehabilitation and reconstruction) and a more size range extends from small emergency event that a major catastrophe. However, not emphasis on disaster management as a task preeminente.

Civil Defence is used in many parts of the world to cover all activities to prepare for disasters, manage and facilitate recovery in short expiry. The term is current in Europe, Russia, Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean. It has the advantage of being easily translated into French, English and Italian. In this sense it is a true umbrella term for its field of reference. However, it can not be easily applied to the management of humanitarian aid, unless it takes the form of mutual aid between adjacent states. Nevertheless, many of the countries which today are humanitarian operation theaters tomorrow will have their own services and civil protection systems. Eventually, there will be a convergence in this area between the rich world and the poor countries. The civil defense

was the ancestor of civil protection. She was born in precautions against air raids of World War II and the Cold War has developed into a system of measures to protect civilian populations against governments and armed aggression by foreign powers. The facts have shown that many civil defense systems were not only costly and ineffective, but also capable of being expropriated for subversive reasons. They could in fact be used to defend the government against the people who ruled, in support of coups and to suppress democratic rights. Civil protection is a system more open and participatory, and one that covers a much wider range of contingent events, including natural and technological disasters. However, the effect of armed renewed emphasis on aggression (ie terrorism), as is developing in the United States, is to refuse protection to the civil defense the previous calendar year. Most experts in this area, including many from North America, see this event as a retrograde step.

Homeland Security è un termine che non ha guadagnato molto spazio fuori degli Stati Uniti. Esso abbraccia tutte quelle attività che contribuiscono alla sicurezza domestica, e quindi di coinvolgere l'industria della sicurezza, un settore in forte crescita, nonchè le attività anti terrorismo e le preparazioni per i disastri naturali e tecnologici. Comunque, non è il termine giusto quando, ad esempio, l'impatto dei disastri naturali è più profondo di quello delle violazioni di sicurezza o gli oltraggi terroristici.

La pianificazione e gestione delle emergenze ( emergency planning and management ) è probabilmente una frase più accurata degli altri in senso descrittivo, ma è troppo lungo per essere stato adoperato largamente. Per di più, esso viene iterpretato in diversi modi da diversi gruppo e quindo non dispone di un consenso su esattamente quanto del campo copre.

Gestione delle crisi ( crisis management ), pianificazione delle contingenze ( contingency planning ) e gestione dei rischi ( risk management ) sono termini che possono essere usati largamente e liberamente, ma in genere vengono usati specificamente nel contesto del controllo delle crisi e abbassamento dei rischi industriali e commerciali. Quindi, sono di valore troppo ristretto per fungere come termini ombrello per l'intero campo.

In sintesi, il campo continuerà ad essere chiamato disaster management in questo documento perché questo termine descrive il gruppo fondamentale di attività associate con la protezione civile e la preparazione per le emergenze. Comunque, bisogna notare che per implicazione la 'disaster management' include anche la gestione del rischio, la riduzione della vulnerabilità e la pianificazione delle emergenze . Infatti, molto più che nella gestione delle aziende e degli organi di governo, nei disastri ciò che serve è l'applicazione di procedure formulate e sperimentate prima dell'evento. Qualsiasi altra cosa e si scende nell'improvvisazione, un fenomeno che deve essere ridotto al minimo.

I protagonisti della protezione civile

Avendo considerato il 'nome del gioco', bisogna definire i protagonisti ed i partecipanti nelle attività di protezione civile. A livello di autorità locale, cioè quello più basilare nell'ottica della gestione delle emergenze, ci sono essenzialmente due tipi di professionista. Il 'disaster manager' tradizionale è bianco, maschio, di media età e reduce di una carriera militare. Egli manca dei titoli accademici di specifica rilevanza a questo campo, sebbene abbia probabilmente preso alcuni corsi brevi nel settore. Un variante di questa figura è l'attuale o ex-membro dei servizi di emergenza che ha scelto una carriera nella gestione delle emergenze, o come un secondo compito o come una new direction in his career.

This figure, rather than stereotype, is gradually replaced by that of a younger person, male or female, of provvenienza variable, which has taken a degree or a master in this area and it is facing as a first career. While the first group is full of people who are poorly trained academically but have lots of experience, the top newcomers in the second group lacks experience, but to a certain extent able to compensate with their training (and eventually succeed in buying experience through their work). Of course, there's nothing wrong with disaster managers as a character from the ex-military or emergency services. What is needed is to achieve a balance between education, training and work experience that will ensure a sufficient level of professionalism when trying to reduce risk, create contingency plans and manage extreme events.

Disaster management in Europe

In many ways, emergency management is well developed in Europe, but there are some common defects, as illustrated by the following list:

- the lack of a robust and comprehensive system for encouraging common methods and exchanges between the different agencies that have responsibilities for emergency management;
- often, the emphasis on contingency planning is inadequate;
- no one learns enough to other countries and there are not enough links between the civil protection systems of different countries
- the civil protection systems currently in force in Europe carry a legacy of outdated methods and attitudes obligations;
- a culture of inflexible bureaucratic obstruction Journal segrettezza and reduces the chances of making the disaster management something more democratic and to increase public participation in preparing for emergencies;
- some you can not identify the source of wisdom and experience, and exploitation;
- it seems that some of the protagonists of European civil protection have become more involved in the management of their own reputations rather than opens themselves from disasters;
- with the rapid evolution of the field and the various forces and tendencies of centrism and subsidiary legislation in this field is often lacking or contraditoria.

These defects are examined by a lack of direction and encouragement from the European Union. In the field of civil protection the EU has committed its member states enough direction, coordination, risorese, and advice. In Brussels, the responsibility for the sector is divided among several directors, including those dealing with nuclear accidents, environmental and industrial hazards. Again, there is between the bureaucracies of the European Union or the European Commission needs a proper system for the exchange of knowledge, experiences, techniques and management methods. Yet there are ample signs that the European countries look to the EU and the EC for general guidance in this area, a need that is expected to grow when the 15 member states become 23.Malgrado these negative comments, there are some signs that the community European Union is taking note of the situation as regards the risks of disaster and that it wants to improve the preparations. It is commonly said that Europe has undergone major changes in civil protection in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. However, there was a delayed response that has slowly gained strength. In this we may distinguish between negative events that have "pushed" the system to change (Ie, the recent disasters) and the effect of "dragging" of technical and organizational innovations.

in the negative, the impact of disasters has become increasingly serious. Over the past five years the storms and floods, for example, have repeatedly caused serious damage in Europe in chaos. These disasters are becoming increasingly expensive and are charging more and more systems of insurance against damage and accidents and environmental management and regional systems of emergency management. In Europe, the recent floods of the rivers Rhine and Oder have not only caused great damage and loss but also getato ilm light on the need to increase international coordination of emergency management. The SARS outbreaks of foot and revealed the possibility that Europe will suffer in future disasters, major epidemics and disease. The inability of the British to manage well the recent outbreak of foot and could be repeated in other European countries.

also the ability to handle the terrorist Attacks may be less than the potential requirements. Few anti fire and hospital services that are able to manage well a biological terrorism attack. Despite decades of experience with terrorism in Europe (Irish and Basque separatism issues, the "leaden years", etc..), The public is still largely involved in the management of the new Community and national security threats posed by new emerging forms of terrorism.

More positively, the emergency management in Europe is gradually acquiring a greater sense of direction. A summit level, the scope and seriousness of the threats have been widely recognized. The scenarios of hazard, vulnerability, risk and emergency response have been completed. European bonds will eventually be established. In the meantime, risk management and contingency planning are gaining ground in professional way. For more., Security has become a large and important issue in the commercial world as it is in the life of the community and in government circles.

Disaster management in the rest World

Some of the problems and delays are common in Europe in the field of civil protection in the rest of the world. There is a lack of common standards, generally accepted, for emergency planning, disaster management, education and training. Traditionally, the field exists with minimal funds. Once finished, the emergencies are forgotten by the public and politicians that do not return. As a result, the field has been developed very occasionally. Major disasters serve as catalytic events that give a boost to legislation, planning and other applications for civil protection. These can be considered "windows of opportunity", recalling attention and resources to preparing for emergencies so that the level of interest from the public allows them (in fact, most of the civil protection laws following the disasters that cause a wave of legislative activity). Could it be that the opportunity to develop disaster management in all three ways (such as a particular academic subject, as a commercial business, as a function of government), depend to a certain point of the next disaster from occurring. However, if so, you can do very little except to recognize that opportunities can come without much notice.

So far the discussion has focused on household size and European, but the problem has another side. No matter, when the time about a dozen humanitarian emergencies in various states of development in different parts of the world. The European countries are involved with relief operations, aid officially shipped, and the work of the armed forces in maintaining peace, or unilaterally or through the UN-sponsored operations. These "complex emergencies", as they are called (ie, disasters are characterized by the failure of the military, social, economic and administrative) are likely to be more common in the future. In fact, the disorder seems likely to increase under the pressure of the growing unequal, and fanaticism, polarization, deprivation, vulnerability, and the prevalent use of force to solve the problems of the world.

In summary, the disaster management is a field that is growing rapidly throughout the world. The country has certainly advanced in America, which, at least at the federal level, offers a well-defined model of organization that has been used by many other nations. However, there are particular problems in applying a federal-state monolithic, given the different division of powers. No matter, if there are many parts of the world in which the field of disaster management is deprived of funds, which are poorly developed, and where under the care of organizations or institutions arrettrate or not yet well developed. So, there is a worldwide demand for training services and advice, although without the addition of large amounts of funding to provide these services. Will be some years before that governments realize that Nonsi can benefit from organization and training through appropriate measures to set up the event and the price too low.

The lesson of these findings is that, despite the growing wealth of opportunities, this field is constantly underrated and backed with insufficient funds. It is a really significant in both Europe and the rest of the world. The market for consultancy, training and education is therefore strong interest but weak financial support.

Summary Trends and opportunities in

nowadays we can observe the following trends in emergency management:

(a) by governments, there is a renewal of interest in the field, which, however, does not yet have enough experience or organization to bring the problem under controllo.Ai national, regional and local government bodies should seek help from professionals. You have to see, however, as these institutions are willing to pay for such services

(b) most likely natural disasters, especially floods, storms and snow will become more expensive and most impressive in the future than their impacts in the past. So they called for more demand to increase the level of preparedness and security, albeit in a desultory manner that varies with the disasters that happen. It seems that the political threat of a terrorist attack has put the shadow of natural disasters, but it is certainly only a temporary effect.

(c) The business and industrial sectors have started getting involved substantially in risk management and disaster recovery (although these terms do not mean exactly the same thing in the public service mean that the private sector. The field of security has grown rapidly, but it seems that has not yet fully understood his need planning, education and training.

(d) Terrorism is again a matter of greater importance, especially in regard to new forms unfamiliar that it might take. The years of terrorism linked to separatism have to put Europe; 'avvanguadia combat this problem, but the management of chemical incidents, biological, nuclear or radiological materials may require a radically different approach, along with new sources of knowledge. Europe looks to U.S. for direction, although again we must remember that what works in a federal country is not necessarily ideal for a monolithic state. Above all, we need to experience that combines the multi-disciplinary fields logistics, sociology, psychology, engineering, physics, chemistry, medical sciences, risk mapping and many other disciplines. The success of the initiatives will depend on how they can unify the various sources of knowledge.

(s) of insurance and reinsurance industries are seriously concerned about the question of insurance against disasters. In recent years, the losses in disasters have become excessive, but also the business opportunities have grown in size. Thus the proportion of financial loss in disasters repaid by the insurance has doubled in 10 years. There is, however, a critical lack of capital to underwrite the risks of disasters. Quindi, le compagnie dovrebbero cercare nuove fonti di esperienza per aiutarli a stimare i rischi di coinvolgimento in questo settore nel futuro. Purtroppo, molte compagnie di assicurazione non sono ancora particolarmente sensibili alla possibilità di collaborare con istituzioni accademiche, ed alcune hanno allestito dipartimenti di ricerca per conto proprio, nel caso della Compagnia di Riassicurazione di Monaco di Baviera, con grande successo.

(f) La domanda per la formazione in materia di disaster management è destinata a crescere. I principali clienti sono il settore della pubblica amministrazione, i servizi di emergenza, e le principali compagnie commerciali. I campo è ancora lontano da raggiungere lo stato di una vera e propria professione, but it's going in that direction. There is therefore a double demand for education and professional training and standards. However, since the field can not yet boast the status of a profession, it can not expect to receive remuneration at the level of that of engineers, doctors and other professionals raggionieri well established. Thus, the training must be of short duration and cost.



Notes [1] Geography and anthropology, sociology, social psychology, economics and actuarial sciences, geophysical sciences and construction, medicine and epidemiology, and studies of economic development (see Alexander, D. 1993. Natural Disasters ).


[2] Quarantelli, EL 1995. What is a disaster? International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 13 (3): 221-229; Quarantelli, EL (ed.) 1998. What is a Disaster? Perspectives on the Question . Routledge, London, 312 pp.

Tsp Buy Annuity Or Not

Dieci principi della protezione civile democratica



1. Civil protection must be a service provided specifically for the population, not only for the state in any of its forms.

2. It must respond to the expressed needs of security and expressed by ordinary people.

3. It must involve the people in participatory manner, in their own safety.

4. It must be organized primarily at the local level: the highest levels of government need to provide coordination, harmonization and support and should not replace the ability to respond to the crisis locally.

5. It must be fully demilitarized.

6. The service should achieve the highest level of professionalism possible.

7. Civil protection must use a generic emergency planning based on scenarios of danger and risk, and act to reduce vulnerability and to address the basic needs of the general population of the areas where the plans are implemented.

8. It should define the sustainable management of the emergency and the reduction of risk and working towards this end.

9. It should be compact with ecological sustainability and urban planning and regional belonging to the local area.

10. It must keep the public well informed of any risks and contingencies that may require you to take actions or measures.

How Big Was John Holmes

, 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States: impact on civil protection




The following article was written in 2002.

The terrorist attacks that occurred on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001 are unprecedented in scale of operation, the boldness and the degree of coordination. It appears that as many as 6 attacks have been planned, of which 3 have hit targets in full, causing the loss of 3000 lives. At the time of writing, not clear if these outrages will be unique in modern history, or they will kick off a new phase of global instability. In any case, the attacks on New York and Washington DC are having a profound impact on civil protection. This article will examine some aspects of the attacks with reference to the organization of emergency planning and emergency response. Although thanks to the media, the events of that terrible day are well known to all, be the first to summarize the sequence events to better understand what elements are important to the future planning of civil protection.

attacks

at 08:45 on 11 September 2001, during a normal commercial flight, a Boeing 767 is hijacked and driven against the upper floors of the north tower of World Trade Center (WTC) in the financial district Peninsula New York in Manhattan. Eighteen minutes later, another 767 hijacked more strikes against the adjacent South Tower. Both towers had 110 floors high. At 10 and 10 minutes a Boeing 757 plunged into the headquarters of the U.S. military, the Pentagon and at the same time another 757 rushes in rural Pennsylvania, apparently mancando il bersaglio che i dirottatori volevano colpire a Washington o nello stato di Maryland. Almeno tre altri aerei con a bordo terroristi armati di coltelli venivano nel frattempo fermati a terra durante il groundstop , il successivo fermo generale dell’aviazione, sebbene la notizia della loro esistenza veniva resa pubblica soltanto dopo diversi giorni.

La capacità dei serbatoi di carburante dei 767 della Boeing di 90.770 litri, mentre quella dei 757 di 42.680 litri. Tutti i 4 aerei erano decollati con i serbatoi pieni pochi minuti prima di essere dirottati. Le 266 persone a bordo, compreso i 19 dirottatori, muoiono negli scontri e non ci sono superstiti. In tutti i tre edifici colpiti, il carburante dei velivoli alimenta deflagrazioni. Fireballs are injected into both towers of the WTC: the northern fire takes between 95 º and 103 º floor, the south between 82 º and 93 º. The fire at the Pentagon, the largest office building in the world, continues for several hours but was contained by the massive structure of the building, designed to withstand a military attack.

The WTC was built in the 60s, with a structure composed of steel beams covered in concrete. The tower has a strong central column in which there were lifts (198 in all), scales and pipes for the distribution of services. The supporting beams radiating from this central section connecting to the outside with the rest of the casing structure.
impacts and the flames destroy the fire, while the temperature in the upper floors of two buildings rose rapidly to about 800-1100 degrees. Within an hour it became the cement dust or soot. Before the beams deformed by the intense heat and then melts. Sixty minutes after the impact the south tower collapses. That follows the north at 1028, 103 minutes after the brunt of the first plane.

According to the designers, the towers were constructed to withstand the impact of a Boeing 707, the normal airliner in the 60s, and block the development of a fire for about two hours, the time "Project" for the total evacuation of the two tallest towers (the World Trade Center consisted of 7 buildings). It would, however, extremely difficult to design these buildings to withstand the impact, the explosion and the fireballs of premeditated and carefully planned attacks like those of September 11.

The overall figure of the dead is estimated to be 44 units in Pennsylvania, 189 in the Pentagon and World Trade Center in 2765, including hundreds of foreigners in the second case from about 60 countries. A few dozen of the victims were Italian. Given that at times of peak times, the host at 40.000 WTC workers and 80,000 visitors, the mortality rate in New York is reduced by evacuation which had, after all, successful. But dozens of people trapped on upper floors with no possibility of rescue by jumping from windows to avoid dying a slow end in the flames.

Of particular importance for civil protection, the death of 343 firefighters and 78 policemen, who rushed to the WTC just after being warned the fighting and, in many cases they climbed the fire escape with the intention of the towers to save people trapped, or to fight the flames.

The collapse could have been much more devastating impact if the aircraft had taken place, and the resulting fires developed in the lowest points of the towers. Thus, these could fall on the buildings adjacent turning as felled trees, while in reality it fell vertically on a rather narrow. At the beginning of the collapse, the displacement of the load on the upper floors at the lower of about 100,000 tons, and the resulting pile of rubble, which also contains the remains of as many as 3 other buildings (including the WTC-7, a 47-story skyscraper ), weighs about 1,200 million tonnes. The collapse generated seismic waves of earthquakes comparable to a maximum magnitude of 3.2.

Analysis

While almost all the individual elements of the attacks are comparable to some aspects of previous events (eg, the clash of a fighter plane against the Empire State Building), the sum of the effects, and thus the severity of the total impact, has no parallel in the history of terrorism. The magnitude of the attack, the degree of coordination and lack of notice fall outside of any other experience. Therefore, planning before the event could not draw enough inspiration from other events to describe the scenario. Despite this, many lessons can be learned by what happened. Here is a brief reflection on some key issues.

problems in New York

evacuation procedures. For years, the evacuation of tall buildings was the subject of dispute. The skyscrapers are high levels of vulnerability with regard to the risk of fire or structural failure. Some photographs taken during the evacuation of one of the towers of the WTC show narrow stairs (of width less than a meter) and crowded with people trying to get down, pinching the walls to pass the firefighters going up, loads of cylinders oxygen and other tools.

Having received conflicting instructions from colleagues, not all the occupants of the towers were going immediately to the outputs, especially those who were still saw the rain of debris from above and that they felt more secure inside and out. Eventually, many of those who reached the stairs were il buio, il fumo e la presenza di grandi quantità di acqua provenienti dalla rottura dei sistemi di spegnimento degli incendi.

Sebbene una quantità elevata di persone siano riuscite ad evacuare dalle torri (forse il 90%), molte persone hanno impiegato più di un’ora di arrivare al pianterreno dal 70º piano e oltre. Una volta arrivate, il fumo, la polvere e la pioggia di detriti che cadeva continuamente nella piazza del WTC rendeva molto pericoloso il tentativo di uscire. Più positivamente, come avrebbero previsto i sociologi che si occupano dei disastri, il panico sembra essere stato molto limitato: la stragrande maggioranza delle persone si sono comportate in modo calmo e razionale, anche in situazioni apocalittiche.

Scenari di pianificazione per gli edifici alti . Nei giorni successivi, alcuni esperti di ingegneria strutturale comunicano ai mass media la gravità degli incendi (cioè, pochi minuti dopo l’impatto) rendendosi conto che le torri dovevano inevitabilmente crollare. Le implicazioni di tali dichiarazioni per la pianificazione degli interventi di emergenza sono profonde. Sebbene sottostimare il rischio di crollo comprensibile sotto circostanze davvero eccezionali, a New York 248 pompieri e 95 soccorritori partirono da 5 distretti e da 34 compagnie dei Vigili del Fuoco newyorchese e poi morirono. Per di più, molti mezzi dei servizi di soccorso vengono schiacciati nel doppio crollo delle torri.

E’ normale basare contingency plans for catastrophic events more likely and less rather than on almost unthinkable with truly apocalyptic consequences. Yet disaster planning needs to "think the unthinkable": it should get used to the Disaster Manager to adapt its decisions and actions at the very unusual conditions. Taking into account that there is nothing more cruel and deceitful of hindsight, we must rethink, rather deeply, the management of major disasters that hit the tall buildings. As part of the municipal emergency plans, we must formulate detailed scenarios of response to such situations.

In the United States each year 16,000 to 20,000 tall buildings catch fire, killing between 80 and 90 people and wounding 800-900. Obviously, the problem is not restricted USI: for example, Sao Paulo in the 70s was the scene of two famous fires in skyscrapers, where dozens of people died trapped. So it's not a problem so unusual.

The most significant issue is the safety of emergency workers, the need to speed up the evacuations, and the need to protect the evacuees while leaving the building. The first part of the attached table provides a range of theoretical predictions of time to evacuate the WTC calculated using some nonlinear equations developed in a series of evacuation drills carried out on tall buildings in downtown Toronto in Canada in the 70s. The second part shows the real time of evacuation after the terrorist attack on the WTC in 1993 when a bomb caused a series of fires and the general diffusion of smoking in both towers. As the data, the total evacuation of these buildings required more than 2 hours, and maybe more than 3.

emergency management. The emergency management center in the district of Manhattan was to be located in the north tower of the WTC, where the Port Authority of New York-New Jersey had rented a suite of offices on the 2 º, 14 º and 19 º floors. The decision to house the main operations center in the WTC was an act of defiance against terrorism following the bomb in '93, He was also a strategic move, given the central role of the WTC in the area of \u200b\u200bhigh finance in New York. Obviously, under the circumstances become less suitable place overall. From this we can conclude that in complex urban environments as Manhattan would be required that different operational centers located in protected areas and connected in a network. Each of these should have the ability to become the main center if that were destined to be rendered unusable.

Other aspects of emergency management in New York have had more positive outcomes. Since the end of the peninsula of Manhattan surrounded by water on three sides, it was pretty easy to cordon off the affected area and control access. I battelli evacuavano i feriti attraverso il fiume Hudson ad un posto medico avanzato a Jersey City, sulla riva del New Jersey. Malgrado la lentezza del trasporto littorale, era molto più facile e sicuro soccorrere le vittime così, ad una certa distanza dal fumo e dalla confusione di Manhattan. Di 5284 feriti, il 7,9% aveva bisogno di una degenza in ospedale. Il centro traumatologico di primo livello più vicino al sito della sciagura raggiunse la sua quota di pazienti (circa 200) entro 2 ore dall’inizio della catastrofe, e in seguito i feriti sono stati distribuiti tra 83 delle 170 ospedali delle 5 borough e 3 contee della zona metropolitana di New York.

Alle ore 17,00 dell’11 settembre il soccorso medico aveva raggiunto la its full strength, but the second wave of casualties, anxiously awaited by doctors and nurses, there was not. Eight hours after the onset of the disaster there was no more need to practice triage.

Search and Rescue. At the site of the New York disaster billion and 200 million tons of debris had accumulated in a tangle very compact but quite unstable. It was extremely difficult to penetrate this to find people trapped, and most importantly, fires broke out all the time. The voids were filled with dust, mud or fire and the surrounding buildings threatened to collapse at any moment (in fact, the WTC-7, 47 floors collapsed towards 17.20 on the same day of the tragedy). Despite search and rescue operation involving up to 1,200 rescue workers at a time (the maximum number that could work in space available), very few people were found alive, and those only at the beginning of the rescue operation.

The enormous weight of the buildings collapsed, and excessive fragmentation took place during the collapses, meant that the proportion of voids was less than the figure of 15% found in other big collapses of buildings, such as in earthquakes. The scale of the massive accumulation and instability of the site required the use of heavy vehicles of the types that are usually not used in such circumstances for fear of crushing the victims still alive but trapped under the rubble. In addition, the precariousness of the site required a series of interruptions to the work of rescue workers were struggling while desperately to consolidate the walls still standing. However, with the passage of time, work became more regular and, by dividing the site into 4 zones of control, 90,000 tonnes of rubble were removed during the first week.

Problems in Washington, DC

An editorial comment published in authoritative newspaper The Washington Post a week after the disaster said that "an examination of the events of last Tuesday indicates that the District [Washington DC] was unprepared for emergency and therefore was unable to react and assist the public quickly and effectively. "This statement serious enough to require clarification and explanation.

communications and emergency response . The United States has a system for transmitting emergency messages to the public through radio and television that is regularly put to the test. On the morning of the disaster this tool was not activated in the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, the majority of citizens obtained information on what to do by the same media that would have sent messages from the government, but the interpretations of the situation made and received from journalists are not necessarily the official ones. In fact, in some cases it seems that an official policy of the emergency was not there. For example, the head of the Office of the Mayor, unable to communicate by telephone because of the overhead lines and cellular networks, used the mail to order the evacuation of federal agencies. But four minutes after the Chief of the city sent the countermand, always e-mail. The first message was sent in response to information, proved wrong, that three other planes were to fall on the capital and the second was the result of a decision not to suspend the operation of government during the crisis.

Aside from the obvious conclusion that e-mail is not a good way to spread an evacuation order, but the Internet was slowed down by overloaded and therefore lost its ability to transmit messages in real time. In any case, in fact non-essential workers were returning home on their own, creating smooth road all over the District of Columbia and blocking the movement of emergency vehicles. A system of traffic management (the result of planning "Year 2000", called "Y2K") was activated only after 3 hours and managed to loosen congestion.

According to the forecasts for any emergency, some satellite phones should be placed in key government officials in Washington. Unfortunately, these tools have remained closed in a closet until the next day. In addition, the Local Health District did not have radios capable of monitoring communications between hospitals and ambulances, and then, given the non-functioning of telephones, was not able to participate in the formulation of logistical decisions and to estimate the availability of health services.

emergency plans. The Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, which has a workforce of 3800 employees, a plan is not kept or anti-terrorist nor a procedure to inform the police and their commanders on the road where and how to respond to the crisis. The commanders were forced to improvise a plan to the minute. The police was not aware of the decision taken by the federal government to send his employees home, and then was caught by surprise by the influx of traffic on the roads.

Meanwhile, the houses of Parliament were not evacuated. Was it better that way, since deputies and senators were not trained in the evacuation and the plan was not updated regarding the location of emergency exits of the building. Although he feared an attack right at the Capitol.

On the other hand, however, the Metropolitan Washington immediately put in place its emergency plan and continued to function well throughout the crisis. Unfortunately, many commuters took that was not in operation and tried to return home on the roads, so the circulating half-empty trains.

The Arlington County (Virginia), peripheral to the city, launched its emergency plan 10 minutes after the start of the crisis. Luckily, however, that there were not many casualties, because the administration of the city of Washington declared that the Washington Hospital Center, the best trauma center in the area, could not accommodate a large number of victims.

Conclusion. At a time when the Secret Service realized that a third plane was heading to the White House (and then with a sudden change at the Pentagon), did not have a procedure to bring it down and at the fighters would cover 200 km before arriving in Washington. But apart from such a drastic measure as hypothetical and killing, was abundantly clear that the magnitude of a possible terrorist attack on the U.S. capital was widely underestimated in the plans, if there were. The scenarios were too modest, particularly about the likely level of chaos, and the existing plans were neither comprehensive nor sufficiently clear about the likely risks. In fact, an emergency simulation carried out during the month of June 2001 provided for a chemical attack in the open air in front of the Smithsonian National Museum, no damage and few casualties.

addition, the Agency for Civil Protection City of Washington had neither the funds nor the manpower to create and burn in a contingency plan of the size you need. Following the crisis, its parent organization, FEMA, churches (and usually won) $ 250 million a week to carry out relief work: infinitely superior to those amounts that were requested (and obtained) to finance the plan before the attacks.

According to the consensus that prevailed before Sept. 11, the city needed to plan well coded but largely generic, such as the plan "ThreatCon" ( Conditions threatening, that is, threatening conditions) of the U.S. military, which lists what to do a series of alert levels. The ThreatCon worked pretty well during emergencies in New York and Washington, but as a tool to deal with such disasters was not enough.

Conclusion

If the terrorist outrages of 11 September 2001 will remain a rather unique series of events in history, or into a new era of attacks, it is not known yet. The events of that day took place in the middle of town so rich in resources and sources of assistance are not missed. If anything, the opposite of congestion and the reactions of convergence towards the site of the attack were a major problem. As a necessary consequence, measures to quell the confusion were necessarily drastic. In this sense, terrorism leads, inevitably, a more authoritarian than other forms of disaster, with the exception of the war itself. Emergency planners need to better address this issue in order to incorporate a structure of civil protection in response to terrorism dominated by police and military forces.

The medical, psychological, economic and strategic disaster will go on for years, with profound impact not only on the victims' families and the prospects for peace in the world, but also on the community of the American Civil Protection. Hopefully, however, that the events of that terrible day, and all his seguito domestico e internazionale, stimoleranno un miglioramento della pianificazione di emergenza, con "regole di combattimento" più precise e scenari di risposta più dettagliati e accurati. Creare questi strumenti considerato un obbligo da molti operatori nel settore che vogliono rendere omaggio ai coraggiosi soccorritori che hanno perso la vita nel cuore di Manhattan.

Tabella nº 1. Tempi di evacuazione della World Trade Center, New York
Tempi teorici di evacuazione
______________________________________
Pauls (1980) equazione di flusso medio
10.000 persone per scala = 2 ore 14 minuti per uscire
20.000 persone per scala = 2 ore 41 minuti per uscire
______________________________________
Pauls e Jones (1980) equazione per il tempo totale di evacuazione
10.000 persone per scala = 1 ore 59 minuti
20.000 persone per scala = 3 ore 56 minuti
______________________________________
Tempi misurati di evacuazione
Quenemoen et alii (1996) evacuazione in seguito alla bomba e l’incendio del 1993
Tempi di evacuazione per 161 persone:
48% meno di 60 minuti
27% tra 60 e 120 minuti
25% pi di 120 minuti

L’11 settembre 2001, il crollo delle due torri termin le evacuazioni 62 e 103 minuti dopo l’inizio della crisi con circa il 90% delle persone evacuate.
______________________________________
Opere citate:
Pauls, J.L. 1980. Building evacuation research findings and recommendations. In D. Can(curatore) Fires and Human Behavior. John Wiley & Son, New York.
Pauls, J.L. e B.K. Jones 1980. Building evacuation: research methods and case studies. In D. Canter (curatore) Fires and Human Behavior. John Wiley & Son, New York.
Quenemoen, L.E., Y.M. Davia, J. Malilay, T. Sinks, E.k. Noji and S. Klitzman 1996. The World Trade Center bombing: injury prevention strategies for high-rise buildings. Disasters 20(2): 125-132.