The terrorist attacks that occurred on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001 are unprecedented in scale of operation, the courage and the degree of coordination. It appears that as many as 6 attacks have been planned, of which 3 have hit targets in full, causing the loss of 3000 lives. At the time of writing, it is unclear whether these outrages will be unique in modern history, or they will kick off a new phase of global instability. In any case, the attacks on New York and Washington DC are having a profound impact on civil protection. This article will examine some aspects of the attacks with reference to the organization of emergency planning and emergency response. Although thanks to the media, the events of that terrible day are well known to all, be the first to summarize the sequence of events to better understand what elements are important to the future planning of civil protection.
attacks
At 08:45 on 11 September 2001, during a normal commercial flight, a Boeing 767 is hijacked and driven against the upper floors of the north tower of World Trade Center (WTC) in New York's financial district on the peninsula of Manhattan. Eighteen minutes later another hijacked 767 strikes against the adjacent South Tower. Both towers had 110 floors high. At 10 and 10 minutes a Boeing 757 plunged into the headquarters of the U.S. military, the Pentagon and at the same time another 757 rushes in rural Pennsylvania, apparently missing the target that the hijackers wanted to strike at Washington or in the state of Maryland. At least three other aircraft carrying terrorists armed with knives were in Meanwhile on the ground when stopped groundstop , the next general aviation firm, although the news of their existence was made public only after several days.
The ability of the fuel tanks of the Boeing 767 is 90,770 liters, while that of 757 is 42,680 liters. All four aircraft had taken off with full tanks a few minutes before being hijacked. The 266 people aboard, including the 19 hijackers are killed in the clashes and there are no survivors. In all three buildings affected supplies of aircraft fuel explosion. Fireballs are injected into both towers of the WTC: the northern catches fire between the 951 and the 1031 plan, the south between 821 and 931. The fire at the Pentagon, the largest office building in the world, continues for several hours but was contained by the massive structure of the building, designed to withstand a military attack.
The WTC was built in the 60s, with a structure composed of steel beams covered in concrete. The tower has a strong central column in which there were lifts (198 in all), scales and pipes for the distribution of services. The supporting beams radiating from this central section connecting to the outside with the rest of the casing structure.
impacts and the flames destroy the fire, while the temperature in the upper floors of two buildings saliva rapidamente a circa 800-1100 gradi. Nel giro di un'ora il cemento diventava polvere o fuliggine. Prima le travi deformavano per l'intenso caldo e poi si scioglievano. Sessantadue minuti dopo l'impatto la torre meridionale crolla. Quella settentrionale la segue alle ore 1028, 103 minuti dopo aver subito l'impatto del primo aereo.
Secondo i progettisti, le torri furono costruite in modo tale da resistere l'impatto di un Boeing 707, il normale aereo di linea negli anni '60, e di bloccare lo sviluppo di un incendio per circa 2 ore, il tempo 'di progetto' per l'evacuazione totale delle 2 torri più alte (il World Trade Center consisteva in 7 edifici). Sarebbe stato, comunque, estremamente difficile progettare questi edifici per resistere the impact, the explosion and the fireballs of premeditated and carefully planned attacks like those of September 11.
The overall figure of the dead is estimated to be 44 units in Pennsylvania, 189 in the Pentagon and World Trade Center in 2765, including hundreds of foreigners in the second case from about 60 countries. A few dozen of the victims were Italian. Given that at times of peak times, the WTC housed 40.000 visitors and 80,000 workers, the mortality in New York is reduced by the evacuations, which had, after all, successful. But dozens of people trapped on upper floors with no possibility of rescue by jumping from windows to avoid dying a slow end of the flames.
Of particular importance for civil protection is the death of 343 firefighters and 78 policemen, who rushed to the WTC just after being warned the fighting and, in many cases went up the emergency stairs of the towers with the intention of saving people trapped, or to fight the flames.
The collapse could have been much more devastating impact if the aircraft had taken place, and the resulting fires developed in the lowest points of the towers. Thus, they could fall on the buildings adjacent turning as felled trees, while in fact dropped vertically on a rather narrow. At the beginning of the collapse, the displacement of the load plans higher on the lower ones is about 100,000 tons, and the resulting pile of rubble, which also contains the remains of as many as 3 other buildings (including the WTC-7, a skyscraper of 47 floors), weighs about 1,200 million tonnes. The collapse generated seismic waves of earthquakes comparable to a maximum magnitude of 3.2.
Analysis
While almost all the individual elements of the attacks are comparable to some aspects of previous events (eg, the clash of a fighter plane against the Empire State Building), the sum of the effects, and thus the severity the total impact, has no parallel in the history of terrorism. The magnitude of the attack, the degree of coordination and lack fall outside of notice of any other experience. Therefore, planning before the event could not draw enough inspiration from other events to describe the scenario. Despite this, many lessons can be learned from what happened. Here is a brief reflection on some key issues.
problems in New York
evacuation procedures. For years, the evacuation of tall buildings has been the subject of controversy. The skyscrapers are high levels of vulnerability with regard to the risk of fire or structural failure. Some photographs taken during the evacuation of one of the WTC towers show narrow stairs (of width less than a meter) and crowded with people trying to get down, pinching the walls to pass the firefighters going up, loaded with oxygen tanks and other gear.
Having received conflicting instructions from colleagues, not all the occupants of the towers were going immediately to the outputs, especially those who were still saw the rain of debris from above and that they felt more secure inside and out. Eventually, many of those who reached the stairs were dark, the smoke and the presence of large amounts of water from broken fire suppression systems.
Although a large number of people have managed to evacuate the towers (forse il 90%), molte persone hanno impiegato più di un'ora di arrivare al pianterreno dal 701 piano e oltre. Una volta arrivate, il fumo, la polvere e la pioggia di detriti che cadeva continuamente nella piazza del WTC rendeva molto pericoloso il tentativo di uscire. Più positivamente, come avrebbero previsto i sociologi che si occupano dei disastri, il panico sembra esser stato molto limitato: la stragrande maggioranza delle persone si sono comportate in modo calmo e razionale, anche in situazioni apocalittiche.
Scenari di pianificazione per gli edifici alti. Nei giorni successivi, alcuni esperti di ingegneria strutturale comunicano ai mass media la gravità degli incendi (cioè, pochi minuti dopo l'impatto) realizing that the towers were inevitably collapse. The implications of such statements for the planning of emergency operations are profound. Although underestimate the risk of collapse is understandable under very exceptional circumstances, in New York 248 firefighters and 95 rescuers from 5 districts and 34 companies of the New York Fire Department and then died. Moreover, many means of rescue services are rolled in the double collapse of the towers.
It 's normal to base plans on events more likely and less catastrophic rather than on almost unthinkable with truly apocalyptic consequences. Yet the planning of disaster requires the Apensare @ the unthinkable: it should accustom Disaster Manager to adapt its decisions and actions at the very unusual conditions. Taking into account that there is nothing more cruel and deceitful of hindsight, we must rethink, rather deeply, the management of major disasters that hit the tall buildings. As part of the municipal emergency plans, we must formulate detailed scenarios of response to such situations.
In the United States each year 16,000 to 20,000 tall buildings catch fire, killing between 80 and 90 people and wounding 800-900. Obviously, the problem is not restricted USI: for example, in the 70 Saõ Paulo was the scene of two famous fires in skyscrapers, where dozens of people died trapped. It's not a problem so unusual.
The most significant issue is the safety of emergency workers, the need to speed up the evacuations, and the need to protect the evacuees while leaving the building. The first part of the attached table provides a range of theoretical predictions of time to evacuate the WTC calculated using some nonlinear equations developed in a series of evacuation drills carried out on tall buildings in downtown Toronto in Canada in the 70s. The second part shows the real time of evacuation after the terrorist attack on the WTC in 1993 when a bomb caused a series of fires and the general spread of smoking in both towers. As the data, the total evacuation of these buildings took more than two hours, and maybe more than 3.
emergency management. The emergency management center in the district of Manhattan was to be located in the north tower of the WTC, where the Port Authority of New York-New Jersey had rented a suite of offices on the 21, 141 and 191 planes. The decision to house the main operations center in the WTC was an act of defiance against terrorism following the bomb in '93, and was also a strategic move, given the central role of the WTC in the area of \u200b\u200bhigh finance in New York. Obviously, under the circumstances has become less suitable place overall. From this we can conclude that in complex urban environments as Manhattan would be required that different centers Operating located in protected areas and connected in a network. Each of these should have the ability to become the main center if that were destined to be rendered unusable.
Other aspects of emergency management in New York have had more positive outcomes. Since the end of the peninsula of Manhattan is surrounded by water on three sides, it was pretty easy to cordon off the affected area and control access. The boats evacuated the wounded across the Hudson River to an advanced medical post in Jersey City, on the shore of New Jersey. Despite the slowness of the littoral transport, it was much easier and safer to help the victims as well, at some distance from the smoke and bustle of Manhattan. Of 5284 injured, 7.9% required a hospital stay. The top-level trauma center closest to the site of the disaster reached its quota of patients (about 200) within 2 hours after the disaster, and later the wounded were distributed among 83 of the 170 hospitals and three counties of the 5 Boroughs the metropolitan area of \u200b\u200bNew York.
At 17.00 on 11 September, the ambulance had reached its full strength, but the second wave of casualties, anxiously awaited by doctors and nurses, there was not. Eight hours after the onset of the disaster there was no need to practice triage.
Search and Rescue. At the site of the New York disaster billion and 200 million tons of debris had accumulated in a tangle very compact but quite unstable. It was extremely difficult to penetrate this to find people trapped, and most importantly, fires broke out all the time. The voids were filled with dust, mud or fire and the surrounding buildings threatened to collapse at any moment (in fact, the WTC-7, 47-story, fell to 17.20 on the same day of the tragedy). Despite search and rescue operation involving up to 1,200 rescue workers at a time (the maximum number that could work in space available), very few people were found alive, and those only at the beginning of the rescue operation. The enormous weight of
collapsed buildings, and excessive fragmentation took place during the collapses, meant that the proportion of voids was less than the figure of 15% found in other big collapses of buildings, such as in earthquakes. The scale of the massive accumulation and instability of the site required the use of heavy vehicles of the types that are usually not used in such circumstances for fear of crushing the victims still alive but trapped under the rubble. In addition, the precariousness of the site required a series of interruptions to the work of rescue workers were struggling while desperately to consolidate the walls still standing. However, with the passage of time, work became more regular and, by dividing the site into 4 zones of control, well 90.000 tonnellate di macerie furono rimosse durante la prima settimana.
Problemi a Washington, D.C.
Un commento editoriale pubblicato nell'autorevole quotidiano The Washington Post una settimana dopo la catastrofe disse che "un esame degli eventi di Martedì scorso indica che il Distretto [Washington DC] era impreparato per l'emergenza e quindi non fu in grado di reagire e prestare assistenza al pubblico in modo rapido e efficace." Questa affermazione è grave tale da richiedere chiarimenti e spiegazioni.
Le comunicazioni e le risposte di emergenza. Gli Stati Uniti dispongono di un sistema di trasmissione di messaggi di emergenza al pubblico tramite radio and television that is regularly put to the test. On the morning of the disaster this tool was not activated in the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, the majority of citizens obtained information on what to do by the same media who would forward messages from the government, but the interpretations of the situation made and received from journalists are not necessarily the official ones. In fact, in some cases it appears that an official policy of the emergency was not there. For example, the head of the Office of the Mayor, unable to communicate by telephone because of the overhead lines and cellular networks, used the mail to order the evacuation of federal agencies. But four minutes after the Chief countermand the city sent, again via email. The first message was sent in response to information, proved wrong, that three other planes were to fall on the capital and the second was the result of a decision not to suspend the operation of government during the crisis.
Aside from the obvious conclusion that e-mail is not a good way to spread an evacuation order, but the Internet was slowed down by overloaded and therefore lost its ability to transmit messages in real time. In any case, in fact non-essential workers were returning home on their own, creating smooth road all over the District of Columbia and blocking the movement of emergency vehicles. A traffic management system (the result of planning 'Year 2000', called 'Y2K') was activated after 3 hours esole managed to loosen congestion.
Secondo i progettisti, le torri furono costruite in modo tale da resistere l'impatto di un Boeing 707, il normale aereo di linea negli anni '60, e di bloccare lo sviluppo di un incendio per circa 2 ore, il tempo 'di progetto' per l'evacuazione totale delle 2 torri più alte (il World Trade Center consisteva in 7 edifici). Sarebbe stato, comunque, estremamente difficile progettare questi edifici per resistere the impact, the explosion and the fireballs of premeditated and carefully planned attacks like those of September 11.
The overall figure of the dead is estimated to be 44 units in Pennsylvania, 189 in the Pentagon and World Trade Center in 2765, including hundreds of foreigners in the second case from about 60 countries. A few dozen of the victims were Italian. Given that at times of peak times, the WTC housed 40.000 visitors and 80,000 workers, the mortality in New York is reduced by the evacuations, which had, after all, successful. But dozens of people trapped on upper floors with no possibility of rescue by jumping from windows to avoid dying a slow end of the flames.
Of particular importance for civil protection is the death of 343 firefighters and 78 policemen, who rushed to the WTC just after being warned the fighting and, in many cases went up the emergency stairs of the towers with the intention of saving people trapped, or to fight the flames.
The collapse could have been much more devastating impact if the aircraft had taken place, and the resulting fires developed in the lowest points of the towers. Thus, they could fall on the buildings adjacent turning as felled trees, while in fact dropped vertically on a rather narrow. At the beginning of the collapse, the displacement of the load plans higher on the lower ones is about 100,000 tons, and the resulting pile of rubble, which also contains the remains of as many as 3 other buildings (including the WTC-7, a skyscraper of 47 floors), weighs about 1,200 million tonnes. The collapse generated seismic waves of earthquakes comparable to a maximum magnitude of 3.2.
Analysis
While almost all the individual elements of the attacks are comparable to some aspects of previous events (eg, the clash of a fighter plane against the Empire State Building), the sum of the effects, and thus the severity the total impact, has no parallel in the history of terrorism. The magnitude of the attack, the degree of coordination and lack fall outside of notice of any other experience. Therefore, planning before the event could not draw enough inspiration from other events to describe the scenario. Despite this, many lessons can be learned from what happened. Here is a brief reflection on some key issues.
problems in New York
evacuation procedures. For years, the evacuation of tall buildings has been the subject of controversy. The skyscrapers are high levels of vulnerability with regard to the risk of fire or structural failure. Some photographs taken during the evacuation of one of the WTC towers show narrow stairs (of width less than a meter) and crowded with people trying to get down, pinching the walls to pass the firefighters going up, loaded with oxygen tanks and other gear.
Having received conflicting instructions from colleagues, not all the occupants of the towers were going immediately to the outputs, especially those who were still saw the rain of debris from above and that they felt more secure inside and out. Eventually, many of those who reached the stairs were dark, the smoke and the presence of large amounts of water from broken fire suppression systems.
Although a large number of people have managed to evacuate the towers (forse il 90%), molte persone hanno impiegato più di un'ora di arrivare al pianterreno dal 701 piano e oltre. Una volta arrivate, il fumo, la polvere e la pioggia di detriti che cadeva continuamente nella piazza del WTC rendeva molto pericoloso il tentativo di uscire. Più positivamente, come avrebbero previsto i sociologi che si occupano dei disastri, il panico sembra esser stato molto limitato: la stragrande maggioranza delle persone si sono comportate in modo calmo e razionale, anche in situazioni apocalittiche.
Scenari di pianificazione per gli edifici alti. Nei giorni successivi, alcuni esperti di ingegneria strutturale comunicano ai mass media la gravità degli incendi (cioè, pochi minuti dopo l'impatto) realizing that the towers were inevitably collapse. The implications of such statements for the planning of emergency operations are profound. Although underestimate the risk of collapse is understandable under very exceptional circumstances, in New York 248 firefighters and 95 rescuers from 5 districts and 34 companies of the New York Fire Department and then died. Moreover, many means of rescue services are rolled in the double collapse of the towers.
It 's normal to base plans on events more likely and less catastrophic rather than on almost unthinkable with truly apocalyptic consequences. Yet the planning of disaster requires the Apensare @ the unthinkable: it should accustom Disaster Manager to adapt its decisions and actions at the very unusual conditions. Taking into account that there is nothing more cruel and deceitful of hindsight, we must rethink, rather deeply, the management of major disasters that hit the tall buildings. As part of the municipal emergency plans, we must formulate detailed scenarios of response to such situations.
In the United States each year 16,000 to 20,000 tall buildings catch fire, killing between 80 and 90 people and wounding 800-900. Obviously, the problem is not restricted USI: for example, in the 70 Saõ Paulo was the scene of two famous fires in skyscrapers, where dozens of people died trapped. It's not a problem so unusual.
The most significant issue is the safety of emergency workers, the need to speed up the evacuations, and the need to protect the evacuees while leaving the building. The first part of the attached table provides a range of theoretical predictions of time to evacuate the WTC calculated using some nonlinear equations developed in a series of evacuation drills carried out on tall buildings in downtown Toronto in Canada in the 70s. The second part shows the real time of evacuation after the terrorist attack on the WTC in 1993 when a bomb caused a series of fires and the general spread of smoking in both towers. As the data, the total evacuation of these buildings took more than two hours, and maybe more than 3.
emergency management. The emergency management center in the district of Manhattan was to be located in the north tower of the WTC, where the Port Authority of New York-New Jersey had rented a suite of offices on the 21, 141 and 191 planes. The decision to house the main operations center in the WTC was an act of defiance against terrorism following the bomb in '93, and was also a strategic move, given the central role of the WTC in the area of \u200b\u200bhigh finance in New York. Obviously, under the circumstances has become less suitable place overall. From this we can conclude that in complex urban environments as Manhattan would be required that different centers Operating located in protected areas and connected in a network. Each of these should have the ability to become the main center if that were destined to be rendered unusable.
Other aspects of emergency management in New York have had more positive outcomes. Since the end of the peninsula of Manhattan is surrounded by water on three sides, it was pretty easy to cordon off the affected area and control access. The boats evacuated the wounded across the Hudson River to an advanced medical post in Jersey City, on the shore of New Jersey. Despite the slowness of the littoral transport, it was much easier and safer to help the victims as well, at some distance from the smoke and bustle of Manhattan. Of 5284 injured, 7.9% required a hospital stay. The top-level trauma center closest to the site of the disaster reached its quota of patients (about 200) within 2 hours after the disaster, and later the wounded were distributed among 83 of the 170 hospitals and three counties of the 5 Boroughs the metropolitan area of \u200b\u200bNew York.
At 17.00 on 11 September, the ambulance had reached its full strength, but the second wave of casualties, anxiously awaited by doctors and nurses, there was not. Eight hours after the onset of the disaster there was no need to practice triage.
Search and Rescue. At the site of the New York disaster billion and 200 million tons of debris had accumulated in a tangle very compact but quite unstable. It was extremely difficult to penetrate this to find people trapped, and most importantly, fires broke out all the time. The voids were filled with dust, mud or fire and the surrounding buildings threatened to collapse at any moment (in fact, the WTC-7, 47-story, fell to 17.20 on the same day of the tragedy). Despite search and rescue operation involving up to 1,200 rescue workers at a time (the maximum number that could work in space available), very few people were found alive, and those only at the beginning of the rescue operation. The enormous weight of
collapsed buildings, and excessive fragmentation took place during the collapses, meant that the proportion of voids was less than the figure of 15% found in other big collapses of buildings, such as in earthquakes. The scale of the massive accumulation and instability of the site required the use of heavy vehicles of the types that are usually not used in such circumstances for fear of crushing the victims still alive but trapped under the rubble. In addition, the precariousness of the site required a series of interruptions to the work of rescue workers were struggling while desperately to consolidate the walls still standing. However, with the passage of time, work became more regular and, by dividing the site into 4 zones of control, well 90.000 tonnellate di macerie furono rimosse durante la prima settimana.
Problemi a Washington, D.C.
Un commento editoriale pubblicato nell'autorevole quotidiano The Washington Post una settimana dopo la catastrofe disse che "un esame degli eventi di Martedì scorso indica che il Distretto [Washington DC] era impreparato per l'emergenza e quindi non fu in grado di reagire e prestare assistenza al pubblico in modo rapido e efficace." Questa affermazione è grave tale da richiedere chiarimenti e spiegazioni.
Le comunicazioni e le risposte di emergenza. Gli Stati Uniti dispongono di un sistema di trasmissione di messaggi di emergenza al pubblico tramite radio and television that is regularly put to the test. On the morning of the disaster this tool was not activated in the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, the majority of citizens obtained information on what to do by the same media who would forward messages from the government, but the interpretations of the situation made and received from journalists are not necessarily the official ones. In fact, in some cases it appears that an official policy of the emergency was not there. For example, the head of the Office of the Mayor, unable to communicate by telephone because of the overhead lines and cellular networks, used the mail to order the evacuation of federal agencies. But four minutes after the Chief countermand the city sent, again via email. The first message was sent in response to information, proved wrong, that three other planes were to fall on the capital and the second was the result of a decision not to suspend the operation of government during the crisis.
Aside from the obvious conclusion that e-mail is not a good way to spread an evacuation order, but the Internet was slowed down by overloaded and therefore lost its ability to transmit messages in real time. In any case, in fact non-essential workers were returning home on their own, creating smooth road all over the District of Columbia and blocking the movement of emergency vehicles. A traffic management system (the result of planning 'Year 2000', called 'Y2K') was activated after 3 hours esole managed to loosen congestion.
According to the forecasts for any emergency, some satellite phones should be placed in key government officials in Washington. Unfortunately, these tools have remained closed in a closet until the next day. In addition, the Local Health District did not have radios capable of monitoring communications between hospitals and ambulances, and then, given the non-functioning of telephones, was not able to participate in the formulation of logistical decisions and to estimate the availability of health services.
emergency plans. The Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, which has a workforce of 3800 employees, guarded or not a plan anti-terrorist nor a procedure to inform the police and their commanders on the road where and how to respond to the crisis. The commanders were forced to improvise a plan to the minute. The police was not aware of the decision taken by the federal government to send its employees home, and then was caught by surprise by the influx of traffic on the roads.
Meanwhile, the houses of Parliament were not evacuated. Was it better that way, since deputies and senators were not trained in the evacuation and the plan was not updated regarding the location of emergency exits of the building. Although he feared an attack right at the Capitol.
On the other hand, however, the Metropolitan Washington immediately put in place its emergency plan and continued to function well throughout the crisis. Unfortunately, many commuters took that was not in operation and tried to return home on the roads, so the trains circulating half empty.
Arlington County, peripheral to the city, launched its emergency plan 10 minutes after the start of the crisis. Luckily, however, that there were not many casualties, because the administration of the city of Washington declared that the Washington Hospital Center, the main center trauma in the area, could not accommodate a large number of victims.
Conclusion. When the Secret Service realized that a third plane was heading to the White House (and then with a sudden change at the Pentagon), did not have a procedure to bring it down and at the fighters would have to cover 200 km before arriving in Washington. But apart from such a drastic measure as hypothetical and killing, was abundantly clear that the magnitude of a possible terrorist attack on the U.S. capital was widely underestimated in the plans, if there were. The scenarios were too modest, particularly about the likely level of chaos, and the existing plans were neither comprehensive nor sufficiently clear about the likely risks. In fact, an emergency simulation carried out during the month of June 2001 provided for a chemical attack in the open air in front of the Smithsonian National Museum, no damage and few casualties.
addition, the Civil Protection Agency of the City of Washington had neither the funds nor the manpower to break in and create a contingency plan for the size you need. Following the crisis, its parent organization, FEMA, churches (and usually won) $ 250 million a week to carry out relief work: infinitely superior to those amounts that were requested (and obtained) to finance the planning before the attacks.
According to the consensus that prevailed before Sept. 11, the city needed to plan well coded but largely generic, such as the piano 'ThreatCon' ( Conditions threatening, that is, threatening conditions) of the U.S. military, which lists operations to perform a series of alert levels. The ThreatCon worked pretty well during emergencies in New York and Washington, but as a tool to deal with such disasters was not enough.
Conclusion
If the terrorist outrages of 11 September 2001 will remain a rather unique series of events in history, or into a new era of attacks, not yet known. The events of that day took place in the middle of town so rich in resources and sources of assistance are not missed. If anything, the opposite of congestion and the reactions of convergence towards the site of the attack were a major problem. As a necessary consequence, the measures were necessary to quell the confusion drastic. In this sense, terrorism leads, inevitably, a more authoritarian than other forms of disaster, with the exception of the war itself. Emergency planners need to better address this issue in order to incorporate a structure of civil protection in response to terrorism dominated by police and military forces.
Problems medici, psicologici, economici e strategici causati dal disastro andranno avanti per anni, con impatti profondi, non soltanto sulle famiglie delle vittime e sulle prospettive per la pace a livello mondiale, ma anche sulla comunità della Protezione civile statunitense. Si spera, comunque, che gli eventi di quel terribile giorno, e tutto il suo seguito domestico e internazionale, stimoleranno un miglioramento della pianificazione di emergenza, con 'regole di combattimento' più precise e scenari di risposta più dettagliati e accurati. Creare questi strumenti è considerato un obbligo da molti operatori nel settore che vogliono rendere omaggio ai coraggiosi soccorritori che hanno perso la vita nel cuore di Manhattan.
emergency plans. The Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, which has a workforce of 3800 employees, guarded or not a plan anti-terrorist nor a procedure to inform the police and their commanders on the road where and how to respond to the crisis. The commanders were forced to improvise a plan to the minute. The police was not aware of the decision taken by the federal government to send its employees home, and then was caught by surprise by the influx of traffic on the roads.
Meanwhile, the houses of Parliament were not evacuated. Was it better that way, since deputies and senators were not trained in the evacuation and the plan was not updated regarding the location of emergency exits of the building. Although he feared an attack right at the Capitol.
On the other hand, however, the Metropolitan Washington immediately put in place its emergency plan and continued to function well throughout the crisis. Unfortunately, many commuters took that was not in operation and tried to return home on the roads, so the trains circulating half empty.
Arlington County, peripheral to the city, launched its emergency plan 10 minutes after the start of the crisis. Luckily, however, that there were not many casualties, because the administration of the city of Washington declared that the Washington Hospital Center, the main center trauma in the area, could not accommodate a large number of victims.
Conclusion. When the Secret Service realized that a third plane was heading to the White House (and then with a sudden change at the Pentagon), did not have a procedure to bring it down and at the fighters would have to cover 200 km before arriving in Washington. But apart from such a drastic measure as hypothetical and killing, was abundantly clear that the magnitude of a possible terrorist attack on the U.S. capital was widely underestimated in the plans, if there were. The scenarios were too modest, particularly about the likely level of chaos, and the existing plans were neither comprehensive nor sufficiently clear about the likely risks. In fact, an emergency simulation carried out during the month of June 2001 provided for a chemical attack in the open air in front of the Smithsonian National Museum, no damage and few casualties.
addition, the Civil Protection Agency of the City of Washington had neither the funds nor the manpower to break in and create a contingency plan for the size you need. Following the crisis, its parent organization, FEMA, churches (and usually won) $ 250 million a week to carry out relief work: infinitely superior to those amounts that were requested (and obtained) to finance the planning before the attacks.
According to the consensus that prevailed before Sept. 11, the city needed to plan well coded but largely generic, such as the piano 'ThreatCon' ( Conditions threatening, that is, threatening conditions) of the U.S. military, which lists operations to perform a series of alert levels. The ThreatCon worked pretty well during emergencies in New York and Washington, but as a tool to deal with such disasters was not enough.
Conclusion
If the terrorist outrages of 11 September 2001 will remain a rather unique series of events in history, or into a new era of attacks, not yet known. The events of that day took place in the middle of town so rich in resources and sources of assistance are not missed. If anything, the opposite of congestion and the reactions of convergence towards the site of the attack were a major problem. As a necessary consequence, the measures were necessary to quell the confusion drastic. In this sense, terrorism leads, inevitably, a more authoritarian than other forms of disaster, with the exception of the war itself. Emergency planners need to better address this issue in order to incorporate a structure of civil protection in response to terrorism dominated by police and military forces.
Problems medici, psicologici, economici e strategici causati dal disastro andranno avanti per anni, con impatti profondi, non soltanto sulle famiglie delle vittime e sulle prospettive per la pace a livello mondiale, ma anche sulla comunità della Protezione civile statunitense. Si spera, comunque, che gli eventi di quel terribile giorno, e tutto il suo seguito domestico e internazionale, stimoleranno un miglioramento della pianificazione di emergenza, con 'regole di combattimento' più precise e scenari di risposta più dettagliati e accurati. Creare questi strumenti è considerato un obbligo da molti operatori nel settore che vogliono rendere omaggio ai coraggiosi soccorritori che hanno perso la vita nel cuore di Manhattan.
Tabella n. 1. Tempi di evacuazione della World Trade Center, New York
Tempi teorici di evacuazione
___________________________________________________________________
Pauls (1980) equazione di flusso medio
10.000 persone per scala ' 2 ore 14 minuti per uscire
20.000 persone per scala ' 2 ore 41 minuti per uscire
___________________________________________________________________
Pauls e Jones (1980) equazione per il tempo totale di evacuazione
10.000 persone per scala ' 1 ore 59 minuti
20.000 persone per scala ' 3 ore 56 minuti
___________________________________________________________________
Tempi misurati di evacuazione
Quenemoen et alii (1996) following the bomb and escape the fire of 1993
Short evacuation for 161 people:
48% less than 60 minutes
27% between 60 and 120 minutes
25% more than 120 minutes
September 11, 2001, the collapse of the towers 62 and the evacuations ended 103 minutes after the start of the crisis, with about 90% of people evacuated. ___________________________________________________________________
Tempi teorici di evacuazione
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Pauls (1980) equazione di flusso medio
10.000 persone per scala ' 2 ore 14 minuti per uscire
20.000 persone per scala ' 2 ore 41 minuti per uscire
___________________________________________________________________
Pauls e Jones (1980) equazione per il tempo totale di evacuazione
10.000 persone per scala ' 1 ore 59 minuti
20.000 persone per scala ' 3 ore 56 minuti
___________________________________________________________________
Tempi misurati di evacuazione
Quenemoen et alii (1996) following the bomb and escape the fire of 1993
Short evacuation for 161 people:
48% less than 60 minutes
27% between 60 and 120 minutes
25% more than 120 minutes
September 11, 2001, the collapse of the towers 62 and the evacuations ended 103 minutes after the start of the crisis, with about 90% of people evacuated. ___________________________________________________________________
Works Cited:
Pauls, JL 1980. Building evacuation Research Findings and recommendations. In D. Canter (editor) Fires and Human Behavior . John Wiley & Son, New York.
Pauls, JL and Jones BK 1980. Building evacuation: research methods and case studies. In D. Canter (editor) Fires and Human Behavior . John Wiley & Son, New York.
Quenemoen, LE, Ym Davia, J. Malilay, T. Sinks, and S. Noji Ek Klitzman 1996. The World Trade Center bombing: injury prevention strategies for high-rise buildings. Disasters 20 (2): 125-132.
Pauls, JL 1980. Building evacuation Research Findings and recommendations. In D. Canter (editor) Fires and Human Behavior . John Wiley & Son, New York.
Pauls, JL and Jones BK 1980. Building evacuation: research methods and case studies. In D. Canter (editor) Fires and Human Behavior . John Wiley & Son, New York.
Quenemoen, LE, Ym Davia, J. Malilay, T. Sinks, and S. Noji Ek Klitzman 1996. The World Trade Center bombing: injury prevention strategies for high-rise buildings. Disasters 20 (2): 125-132.
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